Electoral Competition, Legislative Balance, and American State Welfare Policy

Barrilleaux, Charles; Holbrook, Thomas M.; Langer, Laura

doi:10.2307/3088385

Cited by 198 publications

(175 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…As competition goes down, the policy impact of the dominant party is also expected to decline. Consistent with their expectations, Barrilleaux et al (2002) find that welfare spending per capita is highest when Democrats control the legislature and face stiff electoral competition.…”

Section: Partisan Politics and Public Policysupporting

confidence: 74%

“…Specifically, we draw on recent political science research on politics and state social policies (e.g. Barrilleaux, Holbrook, and Langer, 2002) to propose that the effect of partisan politics on imprisonment rates is conditional on the extent of electoral competition faced by state representatives in their home districts. We also examine whether the effects of Republican strength in state government vary over time.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Partisan Politics, Electoral Competition and Imprisonment: An Analysis of States Over Time*

2005

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The now well‐documented explosion in prison populations over the last 30 years has spurred significant attention in the literature. Early research focused primarily on economic explanations. More recently it has focused on political explanations of prison growth. Here we extend research on political explanations of imprisonment by drawing on the literature on state politics and public policy. We argue that the effect of partisan politics on punishment is conditional on how much electoral competition legislators face. We test this hypothesis using annual state level data on imprisonment from 1978 to 1996. Our findings show that the effect of Republican state legislative strength on prison admissions depends on time and the level of competition in state legislative elections. We argue that these findings suggest the need for a more nuanced understanding of the link between partisan U.S. politics and imprisonment.

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Section: Partisan Politics and Public Policysupporting

confidence: 74%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Partisan Politics, Electoral Competition and Imprisonment: An Analysis of States Over Time*

2005

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“…The politics of redistribution may be different in other contexts, such as for cities with secondary responsibilities for welfare under competitive pressure and for counties in other states with their own historical backgrounds. There might be other important factors that influence the scope of local service provision, such as political culture (Benton 2002a, 197) and electoral competition (Barrilleaux et al 2002). An important caveat of the analysis is that it does not directly tackle endogeneity issues among the variables.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The politics of redistribution in local governments: the effect of gender representation on welfare spending in California counties

Park¹

2014

J. Pub. Pol.

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: This research explores the impact of gender representation at the state and local levels on redistributive choices. This research also examines whether female officeholders moderate the impact of the local economy and institution on welfare spending. Hypotheses are tested across 58 counties in California over ten years, between 2001 and 2010. According to the fixed effect models, women in state legislature had a positive effect on local welfare spending, while women on county boards had no significant effect. However, a positive moderating effect of women on county boards during economic hardship was found. Three categories of control variables include institutional factors, such as the introduction of Proposition 1A and county home rule; political factors, such as the political preference of each county's residents and strength of non-profit organisations; and socio-economic factors, such as intergovernmental revenue, unemployment rate and demographics. Counties with more intergovernmental revenue and supporters of Democratic presidential candidates are likely to spend more on welfare services.

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“…The current study's conceptualization of the political environment is based on the classic liberal-conservative dimension, which state-level studies of AFDC and TANF have repeatedly shown to be an important determinant of support for welfare generosity (e.g., Fording 1997;Soss et al 2001;Barrilleaux, Holbrook, and Langer 2002). In states that assign significant control to local entities, the political characteristics of local environments might affect sanctioning rates in different ways through the actions of three important local actors in the TANF implementation process: case managers, local TANF policy makers and administrators, and local advocacy groups.…”

Section: Politics and The Implementation Of Sanctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Devolution, Discretion, and the Effect of Local Political Values on TANF Sanctioning

Fording

Soss

Schram

2007

Social Service Review

114

131

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Electoral Competition, Legislative Balance, and American State Welfare Policy

Cited by 198 publications

References 10 publications

Partisan Politics, Electoral Competition and Imprisonment: An Analysis of States Over Time*

Partisan Politics, Electoral Competition and Imprisonment: An Analysis of States Over Time*

The politics of redistribution in local governments: the effect of gender representation on welfare spending in California counties

Devolution, Discretion, and the Effect of Local Political Values on TANF Sanctioning

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