Electoral conflict and the maturity of local democracy in Indonesia: testing the modernisation hypothesis

Tadjoeddin, Mohammad Zulfan

doi:10.1080/13547860.2012.694705

Cited by 13 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…This trend is also occurred largely and equally in all regions of Indonesia in the 2014 Legislative Election (Aspinall & Mada, 2016). These findings seemed to reject Tadjoeddin's (2012) argument who says that the less mature local democracy tends to be experienced by districts with lower income, higher poverty incidence and less urbanized.…”

Section: Introductioncontrasting

confidence: 40%

Pilkada 2015 and Patronage Practice among Bureaucrat in West Kalimantan, Indonesia

Ngusmanto

2016

ASS

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Majority studies on electoral dynamics in Indonesia are reinforce patronage as a pattern of relationships between candidates, winning team, and voters. One of winning team element which have little attention from scholars is bureaucrat. Although, normatively, bureaucrats are required to neutral in all type of general election, but in fact bureaucrats is very involved deeply in general elections. Based on empirical research in Sintang District and Ketapang District, West Kalimantan, Indonesia, we found that bureaucrats have a significant role as a winning team in pilkada (direct election for local leader). Patronage is a keyword to explain political relation between bureaucrats and candidate in pilkada. This situation was triggered by the fact that there are many candidates who have social background as civil servant and, consequently, have direct access to bureaucracy. Bureaucrats have high motivation to participate in pilkada as a broker due to protecting their vested interest. In our cases, the vested interest of bureaucrat is career stability which is promising additional personal revenue and social status. Consequently, staffing (circulation of position) within bureaucracy does not followed by auction mechanism (merit system), but following nepotism mechanism (spoil system). The winner of pilkada is socially pressured to accommodate all bureaucrats who has become their winning team. Finally, we discuss our finding and propose future agenda research to understanding this phenomenon.

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Section: Introductioncontrasting

confidence: 40%

Pilkada 2015 and Patronage Practice among Bureaucrat in West Kalimantan, Indonesia

Ngusmanto

2016

ASS

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“…At the same time, class cleavages and family dynasties are less important in local politics than elsewhere in Southeast Asia (see Aspinall and Asad, 2016). 18 For example, Tadjoeddin (2012) finds that violence occurred in 23 percent of the first direct mayoral elections between . Harish and Toha (2017 show that conflict around local elections is a persistent problem.…”

Section: Motivating Evidence On Diversity and Conflict In Indonesiamentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Boundaries of Ethnic Divisions

Bazzi

Gudgeon

2018

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This paper argues that redrawing subnational political boundaries can transform ethnic divisions. We use a natural policy experiment in Indonesia to show how the effects of ethnic diversity on conflict depend on the political units within which groups are organized. Redistricting along group lines can reduce conflict, but these gains are undone or even reversed when the new borders introduce greater polarization. These adverse effects of polarization are further amplified around majoritarian elections, consistent with strong incentives to capture new local governments in settings with ethnic favoritism. Overall, our findings illustrate the promise and pitfalls of redistricting in diverse countries.

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“…In 2005, for the first time, local government heads were elected through popular votes in each subnational government unit, including districts. It was a moment for a true political decentralization to take place (Tadjoeddin 2012).…”

Section: Services Sectorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Indonesia:

2018

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The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or its Board of Governors or the governments they represent. ADB does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility for any consequence of their use. The mention of specific companies or products of manufacturers does not imply that they are endorsed or recommended by ADB in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned. By making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area, or by using the term "country" in this document, ADB does not intend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area.

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Electoral conflict and the maturity of local democracy in Indonesia: testing the modernisation hypothesis

Cited by 13 publications

References 33 publications

Pilkada 2015 and Patronage Practice among Bureaucrat in West Kalimantan, Indonesia

Pilkada 2015 and Patronage Practice among Bureaucrat in West Kalimantan, Indonesia

The Political Boundaries of Ethnic Divisions

Indonesia:

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