Electoral cycles in perceived corruption: International empirical evidence

Potrafke, Niklas

doi:10.1016/j.jce.2018.11.003

Cited by 31 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…In democratic countries, significant changes in government are triggered by elections. This can rationalize positive correlation between the level of perceived corruption and electoral cycles recently discovered by Potrafke (2019). Lan and Li (2018) also found a positive correlation between the level of corruption objectively measured through the imports of Swiss watches and 5‐year communist leadership transition cycles in China (till 2011–2012).…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 67%

Obesity of politicians and corruption in post‐Soviet countries

Blavatskyy

2020

Econ of Transit and Inst Chang

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We collected 299 frontal face images of 2017 cabinet ministers from 15 post‐Soviet states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan). For each image, the minister's body‐mass index is estimated using a computer vision algorithm. The median estimated body‐mass index of cabinet ministers is highly correlated with conventional measures of corruption (Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, World Bank worldwide governance indicator Control of Corruption, Index of Public Integrity). This result suggests that physical characteristics of politicians such as their body‐mass index can be used as proxy variables for political corruption when the latter are not available, for instance at a very local level.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 67%

Obesity of politicians and corruption in post‐Soviet countries

Blavatskyy

2020

Econ of Transit and Inst Chang

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“…Political competition in democracies may promote access to information on corruption cases, as the political opposition benefits from making these cases public. That argument is supported byPotrafke's (2019) finding that corruption perceptions in democracies increase significantly in the year before an election. Reports on corruption issued by a free press can increase the perception of corruption in the population without individuals having increased experience with corruption(Rose and Mishler 2010).…”

mentioning

confidence: 89%

Perception vs. experience: Explaining differences in corruption measures using microdata

Gutmann¹,

Padovano

Voigt³

2020

European Journal of Political Economy

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Understanding corruption is at the heart of treating the dysfunctionality of many countries' public sectors. Yet, most corruption research suffers from one common problem: There is no "objective" measure of public-sector corruption for a cross-section of countries. Most studies on the determinants or the effects of corruption rely on indicators of corruption perception. In recent years, a second type of indicator reflecting stated experiences with bribery has become available. If corruption perception is primarily informed by experience with corruption, these two types of indicators should be very highly correlated. In fact, they are not. This paper deals with the divergence between these two types of corruption indicators. We examine the variation in individual corruption perception that cannot be explained by individual corruption experience alone. We find that both respondent characteristics and country characteristics affect corruption perception beyond what can be explained by individuals' first-hand experience of corruption. Some of these biases may force us to reevaluate results of corruption research that is based on perception data, as well as the anti-corruption policies designed after these results.

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“…Whereas there is a substantial literature on the determinants of corruption in economics (see Dimant and Tosato, 2018;Goel and Nelson, 2010;Lambsdorff, 2006;Treisman, 2000), for intricacies of the role of the government, we draw on insights from the political science literature. The relative neglect of political institutions in formal analysis has been noted by Moe (1990) and other scholars, although some recent studies have studied different dimensions of political institutions in relation to corruption (see Alt and Lassen, 2003;Gerring and Thacker, 2004;Lederman, Loayza, and Soares, 2005;Potrafke, 2019).…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The timing of elections can impact corruption via heightened rent-seeking activity and this is accounted for via the inclusion of ElectionTIME (see Potrafke, 2019). The number of chambers of the legislative branch of government (CHAMBERS) can also have implications for competition among bribe-takers via altering possible opportunities for potential favor seekers to engage in corrupt activity.…”

Section: Robustness Check 4: Considering Additional Aspects Of Democracymentioning

confidence: 99%

Direct and indirect influences of political regimes on corruption

Goel

Nelson

2021

Social Science Quarterly

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This paper studies the direct and indirect impacts of political regimes on corruption. Whereas the interplay of government is fundamental to corrupt acts, the present research sheds new light by showing the direct and indirect influences of dimensions of government structure on corruption. Methods: We employ two different estimation techniques. First, we use OLS regressions, with year and regional dummies. Second, we employ mediation analysis to account for the intermediate role of government size in the relation between government structure and corruption in order to gauge the direct and indirect influences on corruption Results: Results show that government structure, across various dimensions of authoritarian and nonauthoritarian regimes, significantly impacted cross-national corruption. In particular, a nation's stock of democracy and parliamentary systems lowered corruption, while executive tenure and dimensions of authoritarianism added to corruption. On the other hand, the size of the legislature did not matter when it came to corruption. However, the direct influences of these government structure variables are mitigated or reinforced when the intermediate role of government size is considered in a mediation analysis. Conclusions: The breakdown into the direct and indirect effects on corruption is a novel insight of this work, with useful policy implications.

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Electoral cycles in perceived corruption: International empirical evidence

Cited by 31 publications

References 44 publications

Obesity of politicians and corruption in post‐Soviet countries

Obesity of politicians and corruption in post‐Soviet countries

Perception vs. experience: Explaining differences in corruption measures using microdata

Direct and indirect influences of political regimes on corruption

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