Electoral Fraud or Violence: The Effect of Observers on Party Manipulation Strategies

Asunka, Joseph; Brierley, Sarah; Golden, Miriam A.; Kramon, Eric; Ofosu, George

doi:10.1017/s0007123416000491

Cited by 104 publications

(58 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…The available micro-level evidence is more supportive of the core voter hypothesis, with 1 Alternatively, violence can occur in response to electoral outcomes, in particular if the process was flawed (Daxecker, 2012;Tucker, 2007). 2 Other work explores the effects of monitoring and punishment (Asunka et al, 2019;Daxecker, 2014), economic conditions and socio-economic status (Bratton, 2008;Gutiérrez-Romero, 2014), and ethnicity (Gutiérrez-Romero, 2014; Kasara, 2014) on election violence. For a recent review, see Mares & Young (2016).…”

Section: Election Violence As a Campaign Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Unequal votes, unequal violence: Malapportionment and election violence in India

Daxecker

2019

Journal of Peace Research

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Elections held outside of advanced, industrialized democracies can turn violent because elites use coercion to demobilize political opponents. The literature has established that closely contested elections are associated with more violence. I depart from this emphasis on competitiveness by highlighting how institutional biases in electoral systems, in particular uneven apportionment, affect incentives for violence. Malapportionment refers to a discrepancy between the share of legislative seats and the share of population, violating the ‘one person, one vote’ principle. Drawing on recent work on malapportionment establishing that overrepresented districts are targeted with clientelist strategies, are more homogenous, and are biased in favor of district-level incumbent parties, I argue that overrepresented districts present fewer incentives for using violence. In contrast, elites in well-apportioned or underrepresented districts exert less control over electoral outcomes because such districts have more heterogenous voter preferences, raising incumbent and opposition demands to employ violence. I examine the effects of malapportionment on violence using constituency-level elections data and new, disaggregated, and geocoded event data on the incidence of election violence in India. Results from six parliamentary elections from 1991 to 2009 show that electoral violence is less prevalent in overrepresented constituencies, and that violence increases in equally apportioned and moderately underrepresented districts. The analysis establishes additional observable implications of the argument for district voter homogeneity and incumbent victory, accounts for confounders such as urbanization and state-level partisanship, and validates measures of election violence. The findings illustrate that institutional biases shape incentives for electoral violence.

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Section: Election Violence As a Campaign Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Unequal votes, unequal violence: Malapportionment and election violence in India

Daxecker

2019

Journal of Peace Research

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“…The electoral situation in contemporary Ghana is rather different from that in Mexico. Though electoral violence has yet to be entirely removed from the electoral process (Asunka et al, 2017;Oduro, 2012), its use is mainly by non-state actors against each other, and its incidence is considerably mitigated by electoral and political institutions that serve as models in the African Its strategy of working with political actors in defusing potential flash points has been highly commended by international observers" (Odendaal, 2009: 65). Oduro is somewhat more critical of the efficiency and professionalism of the Ghanaian EMB, but he concurs that it is impartial:…”

Section: Ghanamentioning

confidence: 99%

The effect of alternation in power on electoral intimidation in democratizing regimes

Ruiz-Rufino

Birch

2020

Journal of Peace Research

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There is as yet little consensus in the literature as to the underlying drivers of electoral violence. This article identifies a key mechanism explaining the use of electoral intimidation, a form of violence, in democratizing regimes. Within this context, we argue that the use of electoral intimidation against the opposition is most likely to be observed when a country moving to democracy has not yet experienced an electoral turnover. Building on previous theoretical and empirical findings, we provide evidence supporting the idea that alternation in power serves as an effective tool to decrease the tensions between electoral winners and losers. Furthermore, we show that alternation in power is conditional on the performance of electoral management bodies. Based on a sample of 331 elections in 53 countries that have inaugurated multiparty competition since 1989, we find strong and robust support for our theoretical claims. Firstly, we show how alternation in power is determined by the degree of autonomy the electoral management body adopted as part of the political opening process. Secondly, we provide evidence that electoral turnover depresses the use of electoral violence after controlling for relevant variables and correcting for selection issues.

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“…von Borzyskowski, 2018), and election monitoring (Asunka et al, 2019;Claes, 2016;Claes & von Borzyskowski, 2018).…”

Section: Prevention Of Electoral Violenceunclassified

The Role of the Courts in Mitigating Election Violence in Nigeria

Burchard¹,

Simati²

2019

cea

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Esta publicação é financiada por fundos nacionais através da FCT -Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia no âmbito do UID/CPO/03122/2013Violence occurs in a slight majority of elections held in sub-Saharan Africa. Several recent studies have examined the effectiveness of various interventions on the prevalence of violent elections; however, the role of the courts has been relatively less studied. Using data on electoral violence during the 2015 and 2019 Nigerian elections, we examine under what conditions courts can moderate election-related violence. We find that successfully challenging an election outcome in the courts is related to a reduction in the lethality of violence in the next election, but only if the courts are generally perceived as trustworthy. These findings indicate that in addition to building judicial capability, improving generalized trust in judicial institutions is key to reducing electoral violence. O papel dos tribunais na redução da violência eleitoral na NigériaA violência ocorre numa ligeira maioria das eleições realizadas na África subsariana. Vários estudos recentes têm analisado a eficácia de diversas intervenções sobre a prevalência de eleições violentas; no entanto, o papel dos tribunais tem sido relativamente menos estudado. Utilizando dados sobre a violência eleitoral durante as eleições nigerianas de 2015 e 2019, examinamos em que condições os tribunais podem moderar a violência associada às eleições. Observamos que contestar com sucesso um resultado eleitoral nos tribunais está relacionado com uma redução da letalidade da violência nas eleições seguintes, mas só se os tribunais forem comummente percebidos como confiáveis. Estes resultados indicam que além de reforçar a capacidade judicial, melhorar a confiança generalizada nas instituições judiciais é fundamental para reduzir a violência eleitoral.Palavras-chave: eleições, violência eleitoral, poder judicial, resolução de disputas, confiança institucional, Nigéria

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Electoral Fraud or Violence: The Effect of Observers on Party Manipulation Strategies

Cited by 104 publications

References 37 publications

Unequal votes, unequal violence: Malapportionment and election violence in India

Unequal votes, unequal violence: Malapportionment and election violence in India

The effect of alternation in power on electoral intimidation in democratizing regimes

The Role of the Courts in Mitigating Election Violence in Nigeria

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