Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion

Abstract

We study parties' optimal ideological cohesion across electoral rules, when the following trade-off is present: A more heterogenous set of candidates is electorally appealing (catch-all party), yet, it serves policy-related goals less efficiently. When the rule becomes more disproportional, thus inducing a more favorable seat allocation for the winner, the first effect is amplified, incentivizing parties to be less cohesive. We provide empirical support using a unique data-set that records candidates' ideological positions in Finnish municipal elections. Exploiting an exogenous change of electoral rule disproportionality at different population thresholds, we identify the causal effect of electoral rules on parties' cohesion.

Policy or person? The electoral value of policy positions and personal attributes in the Finnish open-list system

“…Under preferential voting systems with multimember districts, candidates cannot compete solely on the basis of party reputation; with several other candidates in the running, the party label loses its power as a means of differentiating between candidates nominated by the same party. For vote-maximising purposes, candidates thus attempt to cultivate a personal reputation by demonstrating distinctiveness from their co-partisans (Matakos et al, 2018; Shugart et al, 2005). The more crowded the list of co-partisans competing for the same seats under the open list is, the greater the incentive becomes to cultivate individual relations to voters (André and Depauw, 2014; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Crisp et al, 2007).…”

“…The tendency of the open list to undermine ideological cohesion is also fuelled by the potential party-level gains that an ideological dispersed list can bring about. By nominating candidates with diverging policy positions, parties expect to reach a greater diversity of voters and increase their overall vote share (Kitschelt and Smyth, 2002; Matakos et al, 2018). Furthermore, parties have strong incentives to invite independent candidates with a large personal following (Cain et al, 1987; Tavits, 2009).…”

“…Turning to the substantive part of the representational link, the literature on electoral systems suggests that preferential voting systems, such as OLPR, do not incentivise candidates to pursue the median voter, but rather to adopt a strategy which allows them to carve out an individual basis of support, and to target discrete voter cohorts (Ames, 1995; Cox, 1990; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Matakos et al, 2018; Shugart et al, 2005). This tendency is further supported by the incentives for parties to field candidates with diverse opinions in order to reach as many potential voters as possible (Kitschelt and Smyth, 2002).…”

The personal vote and party cohesion: Modeling the effects of electoral rules on intraparty politics

“…That is, we focus on the cohesion of preferences—the distance between the ideal point of the party leadership and that of a pivotal party member—as well as policy agreement—the alignment of the party member with party policies. Closer to our notion of cohesion is the work of Matakos et al (2019), who investigate the effect of the disproportionality of electoral rules on candidate homogeneity, arguing that electoral incentives should cause more heterogeneous parties under disproportional rules.…”

Refugee Migration and the Politics of Redistribution: Do Supply and Demand Meet?

“…Besley et al 2010), electoral institutions (see e.g. Matakos et al , 2019 and the ability of politicians to commit to their electoral promises (Osborne and Slivinski 1996;Besley and Coate 1997).…”