Electoral Institutions and Party Cohesion in the Russian Duma

Haspel, Moshe; Remington, Thomas F.; Smith, Steven S.

doi:10.2307/2647916

Cited by 113 publications

(83 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Ames 1995;Haspel, Remington and Smith 1998;Stratmann and Baur 2002;Ferrara, Herron and Nishikawa 2005). In the context of the European Parliament, Hix (2004) has for example shown how legislative behavior in the European Parliament is influenced by Studies of campaigning have found similar contrasts between electoral systems.…”

Section: Legislative Behavior and Ambition: The Moderating Effect Of mentioning

confidence: 99%

Career Ambitions and Legislative Participation: The Moderating Effect of Electoral Institutions

Høyland

Hobolt²,

Hix³

2017

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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In multi-level political systems politicians have several possible career paths, as they can advance their careers at the lower (state) or higher (federal) level. We argue that the design of the electoral institutions influences how politicians respond to these incentives. Analyzing a unique dataset of both 'stated' and 'realized' career ambitions of Members of the European Parliament we find that those who seek to move from the European to the national level participate less in legislative activities than those who plan to stay at the European level.Furthermore, legislators who want to continue in the European Parliament participate more if they originate from party-centered than candidate-centered electoral systems. Finally, firMEPs who aim to move to the national level, participation is substantively lower amongst legislators from candidate-centered systems. These findings suggest that the responsiveness associated with candidate-centered systems comes at the expense of legislative activity, at least in low-salience legislatures.

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Section: Legislative Behavior and Ambition: The Moderating Effect Of mentioning

confidence: 99%

Career Ambitions and Legislative Participation: The Moderating Effect of Electoral Institutions

Høyland

Hobolt²,

Hix³

2017

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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“…Haspel, Remington & Smith's study of the effect of mandate in the Russian Duma found no signi cant differences between PR and SMD deputies. 12 Yet they did nd differences between parties dominated by SMD deputies and those dominated by PR deputies. The study used a measure of party cohesion (how often deputies voted with their parties' majority) to detect PR-SMD voting differences based upon roll-call voting data from 1994 and 1995.…”

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confidence: 96%

Legislative Voting Behaviour in the Russian Duma: Understanding the Effect of Mandate

Thames¹

2001

Europe-Asia Studies

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“…For example, Haspel et al (1998) find that parties in the Russian Duma are less cohesive if a high proportion of a their politicians are elected in SMDs compared to party lists. Stratmann and Baur (2002) find that German Bundestag members elected in SMDs tend to join committees that mainly serve geographic interests, whereas members elected on party lists tend to join committees that mainly serve general public interests.…”

Section: Electoral Systems Career Paths and Legislative Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral Systems, Political Career Paths and Legislative Behavior: Evidence from South Korea's Mixed-Member System

Jun¹,

Hix

2010

Japanese Journal of Political Science

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A growing literature looks at how the design of the electoral system shapes the voting behavior of politicians in parliaments. Existing research tends to confirm that in mixed-member systems the politicians elected in the single-member districts are more likely to vote against their parties than the politicians elected on the party lists. However, we find that in South Korea, the members of the Korean National Assembly who were elected on PR lists are more likely to vote against their party leadership than the members elected in single-member districts (SMDs). This counterintuitive behavior stems from the particular structure of candidate selection and politicians' career paths. This suggests that any theory of how electoral systems shape individual parliamentary behavior needs to look beyond the opportunities provided by the electoral rules for voters to reward or punish individual politicians (as opposed to parties), to the structure of candidate selection inside parties and the related career paths of politicians.

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Electoral Institutions and Party Cohesion in the Russian Duma

Cited by 113 publications

References 25 publications

Career Ambitions and Legislative Participation: The Moderating Effect of Electoral Institutions

Career Ambitions and Legislative Participation: The Moderating Effect of Electoral Institutions

Legislative Voting Behaviour in the Russian Duma: Understanding the Effect of Mandate

Electoral Systems, Political Career Paths and Legislative Behavior: Evidence from South Korea's Mixed-Member System

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