Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties

Neto, Octávio Amorim; Cox, Gary W.

doi:10.2307/2111712

Cited by 577 publications

(334 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…23 The empirical analysis demonstrates that the logic of strategic coordination predicts the number of parties only in democratic settings (see Table 3). In these settings, district magnitude increases the number of parties when many ethnopolitical groups exist and are geographically concentrated, a finding consistent with the party-systems literature (Cox, 1997;Neto & Cox, 1997;Ordeshook & Shvetsova, 1994). In contrast, strategic coordination does not account for the number of parties in nondemocratic settings.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 75%

When Do Votes Count?

Mylonas

Roussias

2007

Comparative Political Studies

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The effects of electoral systems have been tested recently in Africa, raising several questions: Are the systematic effects of electoral rules the same across regime types? Does the conduct of elections affect the process of strategic coordination between voters and parties? The literature to date has not considered these issues and also analyzes elections in settings where a crucial set of its assumptions are clearly violated. The authors argue that the mechanism of strategic coordination only operates in democracies that hold free and fair elections, and they exhibit the ways it is violated outside of this domain. They compile a new data set on sub-Saharan African elections and show that the interaction of electoral rules and ethnopolitical cleavages predicts the number of parties only in democratic settings, failing to produce substantive effects in nondemocratic ones.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 75%

When Do Votes Count?

Mylonas

Roussias

2007

Comparative Political Studies

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“…On the contrary, the adoption of PR followed the formation of fragmented but cohesive political parties (derived from previous social cleavages) (Rokkan 1970, Sartori 1966) -a fact in line with our previous discussion. Moreover, PR encourages higher levels of party fragmentation (Taagapera and Shugart 1989, Ordeshook and Shvestova 1994, Neto and Cox 1997. If, according to collective action theory, the multiplication of (non-encompassing) groups eventually leads to suboptimal results, such as higher transactions costs, distributional coalitions and lower social welfare (Olson 1982), PR cannot be said to reduce rent-seeking behavior.…”

Section: Trade and Proportional Representationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The threshold of inclusion (Tincl), which depends on the average number of parties that are assumed to run in each district, is equal to the highest of one of the following figures: (1) the legal threshold (that is, the legally stipulated minimum 20 Taagapera and Shugart (1989), Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) and Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) employ instead the measure of 'effective magnitude'. Since the effective threshold is the reverse of the effective magnitude, both measures should be seen as "two sides of the same coin."…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies

1999

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Looking at the history of democracies in the developed world, I show that electoral systems derive from the decisions the ruling parties make to maximize their representation according to the following conditions. As long as the electoral arena does not change and the current electoral regime benefits the ruling parties, the electoral system is not altered. As the electoral arena changes (due to the entry of new voters or a change in voters' preferences), the ruling parties modify the electoral system, depending on the emergence of new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old parties. When the new parties are strong, the old parties shift from plurality/majority to proportional representation if no old party enjoys a dominant position, but they do not do this if there is a dominant old party. When new entrants are weak, a system of nonproportional representation is maintained, regardless of the structure of the old party system.

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“…In contrast, plurality constrains the natural state of party competition and reduces party system fragmentation (Clark and Golder 2006;Amorim-Neto and Cox 1997).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Which Matters Most: Party Strategic Exit or Voter Strategic Voting? A Laboratory Experiment

Bol

Blais

St-Vincent

2016

PSRM

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There is abundant empirical evidence that the plurality rule constrains party competition and favors two-party systems. This reduction of party system fragmentation may be due to parties deciding not to enter elections for which they are not viable and/or voters voting strategically. Yet no prior research has attempted to estimate the respective role of parties and voters in this process. To fill this gap, we conducted a unique laboratory experiment where some subjects played the role of parties and others played the role of voters, and where the two were able to respond to each other just as in real-life elections. We find that the reduction due to party strategic exit is higher than that due to strategic voting. We conclude that parties play a key role in the effect of the plurality rule on party system fragmentation.

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Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties

Cited by 577 publications

References 12 publications

When Do Votes Count?

When Do Votes Count?

Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies

Which Matters Most: Party Strategic Exit or Voter Strategic Voting? A Laboratory Experiment

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