Electoral Sentencing Cycles

Abstract

We add to our understanding of the optimal method of judicial selection by exploiting an unusual feature in North Carolina: judges rotate location every 6 months. This allows us to identify the existence and source of sentencing variation over the electoral cycle. We show that when elections approach, felony sentences rise. This increase is found exclusively when judges are sentencing in their district of election, and only when elections are contested. When judges hear cases outside their home district, sentences do not significantly vary over the electoral cycle. Our results show that electoral sentencing cycles can be explained by strategic sentencing by judges in an attempt to please voters. The unique setting allows us to reject alternative behavioral or contextual explanations for the rise in sentences as elections approach. (JEL K42).

Do Private Prisons Affect Criminal Sentencing?

“…It shows that electoral competition leads judges to levy harsher sentences in the lead-up to elections (Huber and Gordon, 2004;Berdej ó and Yuchtman, 2013;Dippel and Poyker, 2019;Abrams, Galbiati, Henry, and Philippe, 2019). The presence of such cycles implies that 'direct influence' by private prisons should be most important when judges are seeking re-election (by way of campaign contributions).…”

“…Our paper contributes to a literature on judicial decision making, and in particular the "extralegal considerations" of judges (Posner 2008, p8-11). Amongst these are the fiscal costs of incarceration (Ouss, 2018), prisons' capacity constraints (Mueller-Smith andSchnepel, 2019), defendants' race (Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2000;Abrams, Bertrand, and Mullainathan, 2012;Park, 2014), media scrutiny (Lim, Silveira, and Snyder, 2016), judges' own characteristics like gender, ethnicity and party affiliation Lim, Snyder, and Str ömberg, 2015), their re-election concerns (Huber and Gordon, 2004;Berdej ó and Yuchtman, 2013;Abrams et al, 2019), and even their emotions on the day (Eren and Mocan, 2018). We show that the presence of private prisons needs be added to the list of extra-legal considerations, and that their impact is most likely explained by judges' considering the fiscal costs of incarceration.…”