Electoral volatility and the dynamics of electoral reform

Do electoral reforms tend to favour the incumbents? A quantitative analysis

“…In line with this notion, some authors point out that reforms, even if planned to serve the interests of the incumbents, might not be beneficial for them (Kaminski 2002), as information incompleteness is persistent, and miscalculations of the reforms' effects are frequent. Similarly, Núñez et al (2017) show that the emergence of new parties is a powerful explanation for reforms that reduce the openness of electoral systems. The authors argue that these post hoc reactions to newcomers suggest that politicians may not be able to anticipate electoral changes.…”

“…Other papers analyse more nuanced aspects of institutional changes, including the impact of fragmentation and volatility on preferences for electoral system types and the established parties' insistence on entry barriers when new parties are emerging (Bawn 1993;Colomer 2005;Núñez et al 2017;Pilet and Bol 2011;Remmer 2008;Sebők et al 2019;Shugart 1992).…”

Democracy and Institutional Change in Times of Crises in Latin America

“…Despite presidents inviting the army to fortify their position during political crises in Peru, Chile or Ecuador, the armies’ more visible involvement did not present a radical break, and they have not sought to undermine their subordination to civilian authorities. Even in countries where presidents pressed illiberal agendas – as in Brazil and El Salvador – the democratic erosion was not driven by the military itself, but rather by civilian leadership (Polga-Hecimovich, 2023). Similarly to the civil-military relations, democratic institutions have – by and large – remained resilient vis-à-vis the Covid-19 pandemic challenge, at least judging by the court-executive relationship (Llanos and Weber Tibi, 2023).…”

“…Earlier research showed that Latin American constitutional change is most frequent after political crises involving irregular transfers of executive powers and executive-legislative conflicts (Negretto, 2012). Other dimensions of political turmoil, such as elevated rates of electoral volatility when established parties collapse and new ones emerge, have also been linked to a heightened tempo of institutional reformism (Núñez et al, 2017). Confirming this line of reasoning a key chapter shows thatout of an arsenal of independent variablesonly electoral volatility in presidential elections is a significant predictor of the likelihood of a substantial institutional reform of political representation in a comparison of all Latin American countries (Freidenberg et al, 2022).…”