Constructivism has a problem in accounting for agent-led change and for what motivates agents to make up their minds about how to put their agency to use. I show that constructivismÕs problem of change is related to tensions between constructivism's own key assumptions about the mutually constitutive relationship between structure and agency, understanding of change and to an essentialist conception of identity. I argue that agency is constituted through processes of ÔidentificationÕ involving identity and narrative constructions and performance through practice and action. I make the perhaps controversial move to regard ontological security as a precondition for agent-led change and to identify ontological security maximisation as functionally equivalent to rationalist theoriesÕ agent assumption of utility maximisation. I identify two strategies for maximising ontological security; a Ôstrategy of beingÕ to secure a stable and esteem-enhancing identity and a strong narrative; and a Ôstrategy of doingÕ to ensure cognitive consistency through routinised practice whilst also undertaking action contributing to a sense of integrity and pride. The article concludes that although humans are endowed with agency, their actual ability to utilise their agency is severely constrained by their need for maintaining ontological security, which may explain why change appears so difficult to achieve.Keywords: Narrative, Social Identity Theory, Agency, Practice, Ontological Security, Identity
Bio: Trine Flockhart is Professor of International Relations in the School of Politics and InternationalStudies at the University of Kent. Her research focuses on change in the international system towards a Ômulti-order worldÕ and the effects on the current liberal international order, transatlantic relations and NATO.
The Problem of Change in Constructivist Theory
Ontological Security Seeking and Agent MotivationOne of the fundamental questions in International Relations is how to change the world into a better place. Yet, despite the normative aspirations to change dysfunctional, and often violent, practices, the IR discipline developed a widespread understanding that Ôthe internationalÕ was characterized by continuity and recurring patterns, and that the aspiration for making a better world, was an idealistic Ð even a utopian Ð project. The belief that change was unattainable became so ingrained in the discipline that when the Cold War ended, most had not even considered the possibility that such a change could take place 1 and some even questioned its theoretical relevance 2 . Moreover, change was seen as one of those intellectual nettles that would be better left alone 3 rather than as something that could be theorized, categorized and conceptualized or indeed used prescriptively 4 . Therefore when