Electromagnetic attacks on embedded devices: A model of probe-circuit power coupling

Alberto, Diego; Maistri, Paolo; Leveugle, Régis

doi:10.1109/dtis.2014.6850648

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2014

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“…When the power delivered by the probe to the surface of the circuit is known, it is possible to calculate the amount of energy that is reflected or absorbed by each layer of the circuit [12]. To achieve this, the layout of the circuit and the parameters of the fabrication process must be known.…”

Section: Em Power Couplingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electromagnetic analysis and fault injection onto secure circuits

Maistri

Leveugle

Bossuet

et al. 2014

2014 22nd International Conference on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI-SoC)

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International audienceImplementation attacks are a major threat to hardware cryptographic implementations. These attacks exploit the correlation existing between the computed data and variables such as computation time, consumed power, and electromagnetic (EM) emissions. Recently, the EM channel has been proven as an effective passive and active attack technique against secure implementations. In this paper, we resume the recent results obtained on this subject, with a particular focus on EM as a fault injection tool

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Section: Em Power Couplingmentioning

confidence: 99%