Electromagnetic Glitch on the AES Round Counter

Dehbaoui, Amine; Mirbaha, Amir-Pasha; Moro, Nicolas; Dutertre, Jean-Max; Tria, Assia

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-40026-1_2

Cited by 24 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Assuming a wrong PIN, function byteArrayCompare returns a value BOOL_FALSE (which 2 A smaller monitor can be used for jump attacks in this case, see Figure 4. 3 An additional state has to be added to MTI in this case, see is assigned to _t1). Thus, value 0 is assigned to variable _t2 as a result of the logical instruction _t2:=(_t1 == BOOL_TRUE).…”

Section: Monitorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detecting Fault Injection Attacks with Runtime Verification

Kassem

Falcone

2019

Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Workshop on Software Protection

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Fault injections are increasingly used to attack/test secure applications. In this paper, we define formal models of runtime monitors that can detect fault injections that result in test inversion attacks and arbitrary jumps in the control flow. Runtime verification monitors offer several advantages. The code implementing a monitor is small compared to the entire application code. Monitors have a formal semantics; and we prove that they effectively detect attacks. Each monitor is a module dedicated to detecting an attack and can be deployed as needed to secure the application. A monitor can run separately from the application or it can be "weaved" inside the application. Our monitors have been validated by detecting simulated attacks on a program that verifies a user PIN.

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Section: Monitorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detecting Fault Injection Attacks with Runtime Verification

Kassem

Falcone

2019

Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Workshop on Software Protection

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“…On the control flow, the most popular fault models are to skip the execution of a specific instruction (i.e, instruction skip) [42], [43], multiple instruction skips [44], [45], replacing an instruction with another one (i.e, instruction modification) [46], [21], changing the result of a conditional branch [47], [48], and tampering with loop counters [49], [50].…”

Section: A Fault Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fault Attacks on Secure Embedded Software: Threats, Design, and Evaluation

Yuce

Schaumont

Witteman³

2018

J Hardw Syst Secur

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Embedded software is developed under the assumption that hardware execution is always correct. Fault attacks break and exploit that assumption. Through the careful introduction of targeted faults, an adversary modifies the controlflow or data-flow integrity of software. The modified program execution is then analyzed and used as a source of information leakage, or as a mechanism for privilege escalation. Due to the increasing complexity of modern embedded systems, and due to the difficulty of guaranteeing correct hardware execution even under a weak adversary, fault attacks are a growing threat. For example, the assumption that an adversary has to be close to the physical execution of software, in order to inject an exploitable fault into hardware, has repeatedly been shown to be incorrect. This article is a review on hardware-based fault attacks on software, with emphasis on the context of embedded systems. We present a detailed discussion of the anatomy of a fault attack, and we make a review of fault attack evaluation techniques. The paper emphasizes the perspective from the attacker, rather than the perspective of countermeasure development. However, we emphasize that improvements to countermeasures often build on insight into the attacks.

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“…In [8], the authors performed an attack on an up-to-date 32bit microcontroller based on the ARM Cortex-M3 processor. Their attack targeted the round counter of a software AES implementation.…”

Section: General Purpose Cpusmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electromagnetic analysis and fault injection onto secure circuits

Maistri

Leveugle

Bossuet

et al. 2014

2014 22nd International Conference on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI-SoC)

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International audienceImplementation attacks are a major threat to hardware cryptographic implementations. These attacks exploit the correlation existing between the computed data and variables such as computation time, consumed power, and electromagnetic (EM) emissions. Recently, the EM channel has been proven as an effective passive and active attack technique against secure implementations. In this paper, we resume the recent results obtained on this subject, with a particular focus on EM as a fault injection tool

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Electromagnetic Glitch on the AES Round Counter

Cited by 24 publications

References 10 publications

Detecting Fault Injection Attacks with Runtime Verification

Detecting Fault Injection Attacks with Runtime Verification

Fault Attacks on Secure Embedded Software: Threats, Design, and Evaluation

Electromagnetic analysis and fault injection onto secure circuits

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