Task-cuing experiments are usually intended to explore control of task-set. But when small stimulus sets are used, they plausibly afford learning of the response associated with a combination of cue and stimulus, without reference to tasks. In three experiments we presented the typical trials of a task-cuing experiment: a cue (colored shape) followed, after a short or long interval, by a digit to which one of two responses was required. In a "Tasks" condition, participants were (as usual) directed to interpret the cue as an instruction to perform either an odd/even or a high/low classification task. In a "CSR" condition, to induce learning of mappings between cue-stimulus compound and response, participants were: in Experiment 1, given standard task instructions and additionally encouraged to learn the CSR mappings; in Experiment 2, informed of all the CSR mappings and asked to learn them, without standard task instructions; in Experiment 3, required to learn the mappings by trial and error. The effects of a task switch, response congruence, preparation, and transfer to a new set of stimuli, differed substantially between the conditions in ways indicative of classification according to task rules in the Tasks condition, and retrieval of responses specific to stimulus-cue combinations in the CSR conditions. Qualitative features of the latter could be captured by an associative learning network. Hence associatively-based compound retrieval can serve as the basis for performance with a small stimulus set. But, when organisation by tasks is apparent, control via task-set selection is the natural and efficient strategy.Keywords: task-switching, task-cuing, associative learning, conditional discrimination, connectionist modeling Forrest Monsell & McLaren 3 Human behaviour is often attributed to two types of processing: a set of controlled, resource-limited, and effortful processes, and a complementary set of involuntary, resourceunlimited and effortless processes. These have been referred to as "cognitive" and "associative" (McLaren, Green & Mackintosh, 1994) or as "intentional" and "automatic" (Jacoby, 1991). Typically, processes at both levels are thought to operate simultaneously, with a degree of independence (see McLaren, Green and Mackintosh, 1994 for a statement of this position and Mitchell, De Houwer & Lovibond 2009;Shanks, 2010 for critical reviews of it). In this paper, we examine aspects of performance in a task-switching paradigm often assumed to index "executive" or "endogenous" control processes, and ask to what extent performance might instead be accounted for by associative learning.Reconfiguring one's mind to perform a different task, especially when the environment continues to afford the previous task, seems a paradigmatic case of a controlled (endogenous, top-down, voluntary) cognitive process. Task-switching experiments intended to exercise and measure task-set control have attracted considerable interest over the last two decades (see Kiesel et al 2010;Monsell, 2003;Vandierendonck, ...