Elements of Terrorism Preparedness in Local Police Agencies, 2003-2007

Abstract

Different elements of local police agencies’ terrorism preparedness may be associated with different organizational/environmental variables. We use 2003-2007 data (showing considerable adoption and desistance of practices) on medium-to-large-sized local agencies to examine relationships between contingency (vulnerability, organizational characteristics) and contagion (network/isomorphic influence) measures and preparedness elements, including terrorism special units, dedicated assignment of personnel, terrorism-related community outreach, computerized intelligence files, and interagency-shared radio frequencies. Modeling 2007 preparedness revealed consistencies and some differences in the associations between these measures and the different preparedness elements. The finding of no association between objective vulnerability score and any terrorism preparedness action particularly warrants further research attention. It will also be important to extend preparedness research into the recent period of economic recession.

Agency Correlates of Police Militarization: The Case of MRAPs

“…One explanation for this null finding is that LEAs do not view MRAPs as a critical component in their fight against terrorism. Previous research on terrorism preparedness suggests that information sharing, community engagement, and organization restructuring—but not MRAPs or other vehicle acquisitions—are common terrorism preparedness actions among local LEAs (Ortiz, Hendricks, & Sugie, 2007; Roberts, Roberts, & Liedka, 2012). A supplemental analysis (available upon request) of a sample of 1033 applications collected by Redden (2015) shows that terrorism was only mentioned by 7% of LEAs when requesting MRAPs.…”

Understanding Body-Worn Camera Diffusion in U.S. Policing

“…Another theory is larger agencies tend to be more familiar with adopting new strategies (Morabito, 2010;Roberts et al, 2012) and technologies (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2013;Willits & Nowacki, 2016), which could translate to less fear of uncertainties. Indeed, agencies that had adopted innovations in the past were more likely to be using BWCs in a recent study (Nowacki & Willits, 2018).…”

The use of specialized cybercrime policing units: an organizational analysis

“…Organizational theorists suggest that the factors which predict early adoption and late adoption are different. For example, research links the early adoption to organizational characteristics, including size and resources (Skogan & Harnett, 2005;Tolbert & Zucker, 1983;Weisburd & Lum, 2005), a result which is also found in other studies of police innovation (Morabito, 2010;Roberts et al, 2012). Conversely, organizational scholars link late adoption to broader forces, like the widespread acceptance or legitimation of a particular innovation (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983).…”

“…Other research, though not always framed explicitly in a contingency perspective, suggests that the adoption of specific innovations by police agencies is linked to environmental contingencies. For example, structural complexity (Damanpour, 1991;1996;Roberts et al, 2012), legislation (Drew, 2011), grant receipt (Helms & Gutierrez, 2007), pressure from the community (Katz, 2001), age of the organization (Katz et al, 2002), form of government (Morabito, 2010), technology (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2012), and department size (Morabito, 2010;Roberts et al, 2012) are all correlated with the adoption of police innovation.…”