Eligibility and Inscrutability

Williams, John

doi:10.1215/00318108-2007-002

Cited by 77 publications

(58 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…There is nothing wrong with the definition of 'avekid'; it is perfectly determinate and we could use it without 30 See Dorr and Hawthorne (2013) for discussion. 31 Williams (2007). For commentary, see Hawthorne (2007), Bays (2007) and Sider (2011: ch. 3).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the indeterminacy of the meter

Scharp

2017

Synthese

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In the International System of Units (SI), 'meter' is defined in terms of seconds and the speed of light, and 'second' is defined in terms of properties of cesium 133 atoms. I show that one consequence of these definitions is that: if there is a minimal length (e.g., Planck length), then the chances that 'meter' is completely determinate are only 1 in 21,413,747. Moreover, we have good reason to believe that there is a minimal length. Thus, it is highly probable that 'meter' is indeterminate. If the meter is indeterminate, then any unit in the SI system that is defined in terms of the meter is indeterminate as well. This problem affects most of the familiar derived units in SI. As such, it is highly likely that indeterminacy pervades the SI system. The indeterminacy of the meter is compared and contrasted with emerging literature on indeterminacy in measurement locutions (as in Eran Tal's recent argument that measurement units are vague in certain ways). Moreover, the indeterminacy of the meter has ramifications for the metaphysics of measurement (e.g., problems for widespread assumptions about the nature of conventionality, as in Theodore Sider's Writing the Book of the World) and the semantics of measurement locutions (e.g., undermining the received view that measurement phrases are absolutely precise as in Christopher Kennedy's and Louise McNally's semantics for gradable adjectives). Finally, it is shown how to redefine 'meter' and 'second' to completely avoid the indeterminacy.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the indeterminacy of the meter

Scharp

2017

Synthese

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“…According to one version of Lewis's view, the perfectly natural properties are those that are referred to by our most fundamental physical theory, and a property F is more natural than G iff the members of F resemble one another more closely in perfectly natural respects than the members of G. Alternatively, one might think that the assignments should best match certain causal relations (Field 1975;Williams 2007). All of these suggestions have some initial plausibility.…”

Section: Radical Interpretationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Metasemantics out of Economics?

Hattiangadi¹

2015

Weighing and Reasoning

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“…The view considered by Putnam (1980) and defended in Lewis (1984) under the label 'global descriptivism' is another variant. Williams (2007) gives an overview of interpretationisms. Williams (2005, ch 1, 2) goes into more detail on the interpretationist metaphysics of semantic facts.…”

Section: Interpretationisms and Charitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Fundamental and Derivative Truths

Williams¹

2010

Mind

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This paper investigates the claim that some truths are fundamentally or really trueand that other truths are not. Such a distinction can help us reconcile radically minimal metaphysical views with the verities of common sense.I develop an understanding of the distinction whereby Fundamentality is not itself a metaphysical distinction, but rather a device that must be presupposed to express metaphysical distinctions. Drawing on recent work by Rayo on anti-Quinean theories of ontological commitments, I formulate a rigourous theory of the notion.In the final sections, I show how this package dovetails with 'interpretationist' theories of meaning to give sober content to thought that some things-perhaps sets, or gerrymandered mereological sums-can be 'postulated into existence'. Fundamentality as an expressive deviceIn recent work, Kit Fine has suggested that we distinguish what really obtains from what merely obtains. The distinction applies, in particular, to existential statements. So it may be that some things exist, but don't really exist. A comparable distinction (which I here treat as equivalent) is the following: some things are fundamentally the case; other things are derivatively the case.Applied to existential claims: some things fundamentally exist; others exist derivatively. 1 1 Despite appearances, this is not supposed to introduce two 'kinds' of existence, any more than the common distinction between contingent and necessary existents introduces two kinds of existence.Following Fine, I will speak of facts and employ the 'container' metaphor: of facts belonging or failing to belong to fundamental reality. But everything I say should be able to be interpreted using the sentential operator: It is fundamentally the case that p. So no commitment to an ontology of facts, or to reality as 'containing' or 'composed out of' these facts is intended. Compare (Sider, 2009).Fine uses the framework for a variety of purposes. See in particular Fine (2005), paper 8 and especially Fine (2001). 1The task of the present paper is to outline one way of understanding this distinction, and to begin constructing a theory of how it behaves. To fix ideas it will be useful to have in mind some putative applications of the distinction:Composition: fundamental simplism with derivative arbitrary fusion (FSDA).Fundamentally, everything is a simple, microphysical particle. Derivatively, whenever there are some objects, they compose something. Tables, rocks, and chairs exist; but they are no part of fundamental reality. 2 Set theory: fundamental nominalism; derivative sets (FNDS).Fundamentally, everything is concrete. Derivatively, the axioms of ZFCU hold good.The null set, and the set of readers of this essay exist; but they are no part of fundamental reality.These doctrines will be controversial in their own right, even for one who accepts the fundamental/derivative distinction. Other set theories, or other material ontologies, might be put forward as describing the non-fundamental world. Equally, some would defend a le...

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Eligibility and Inscrutability

Cited by 77 publications

References 36 publications

On the indeterminacy of the meter

On the indeterminacy of the meter

Metasemantics out of Economics?

Fundamental and Derivative Truths

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