Elite collective agency and the state

Abstract

The paper explores how elites can develop capacity for collective agency through coordination.. The challenge for elites is to simultaneously deter the state from abusing power while at the same time relying on it to discipline defectors in their midst..The basic insight holds that the credibility of the state's threats depends on the cost of carrying them out, which elites can control. The elites can coordinate by being compliant when the ruler's threats serve their collective interest, which by reducing the cost of carrying them out make them more credible. On the other hand, their coordinated non-compliance has the opposite effect...

Collective action, opportunism, and class agency under ineffective state enforcement: Marx on English Factory Laws

“…Much of this literature ignores any role for collective action, elite or class agency, with a few exceptions. One is North et al (2009) where coalitions of elites precede state formation, and the few recent papers that build on this approach (Erturk, 2020;van Bavel et al, 2017) share a similar orientation with this paper. Another exception is Greif et al (1994) which considers the role of merchant guilds in historical context in which the long-distance traders' collective boycott threat helps a sovereign hosting them commit to respecting their property rights.…”

“…One is North et al . (2009) where coalitions of elites precede state formation, and the few recent papers that build on this approach (Erturk, 2020; van Bavel et al ., 2017) share a similar orientation with this paper. Another exception is Greif et al .…”