Emancipating the political economy of Asia from the growth paradigm

Boyd, Richard; Ngo, Tak-Wing

doi:10.4324/9780203308233_chapter_1

Cited by 10 publications

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“…Since the extension of special favour and convenience often involves non-material benefits, we have excluded it here in order to simplify the discussion. 8 For a critique of such stylized understanding of the East Asian states, see [2].…”

Section: The Creation and Allocation Of Rents In Industrial Planningmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Rent-seeking and economic governance in the structural nexus of corruption in China

Ngo

2008

Crime Law Soc Change

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This article examines the sources of widespread rent-seeking practices and their relations to corruption in China. It argues that rent-creation and seeking are difficult to eliminate because they have become institutionalized as the constitutive parts of economic governance. Using case studies drawn from a number of industrial sectors, this study shows that the creation and allocation of economic rents has become a major policy instrument used by various levels of governments to manoeuvre industrial plans and development priorities. At the same time, the discretionary power exercised by state agents in implementing development priorities has created mounting opportunities for exchanging rents with bribes. The result is a structural nexus between economic governance, rentseeking and corruption that defy administrative measures aiming at achieving a clean government in China.Rent-seeking constitutes one of the most common sources of corruption in present-day China. Economic rents are generated when productions licenses are rationed, when prices are fixed, when trade quotas are imposed by the government, and so on. Typically, bribes are offered by businesses to government officials in exchange for the creation and allocation of rents. Ample opportunities of rent-seeking therefore bear directly on the prevalence of corruption in China.Constraining the creation and the pursuit of economic rents thus constitutes one of the many steps towards controlling rampant corruption in China. This article argues, however, that rent-creation and seeking are difficult to eliminate because they have become institutionalized as the constitutive parts of economic governance. Rent has been used by the central government as a policy instrument in effecting industrial plans and development priorities. Local governments have relied on rent allocation to manoeuvre the development of local political economies. At the same time, many private businesses have become

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Section: The Creation and Allocation Of Rents In Industrial Planningmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The Yuanhua case is regarded by observers as an indication of the rise of collective corruption in China. 2 It is a case involving government-business collusion in organized crime. The crime concerns illegal evasion of taxes in the form of smuggling, and corruption in the form of taking bribes to cover up the smuggling.…”

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confidence: 99%

Rent-seeking and economic governance in the structural nexus of corruption in China

Ngo

2008

Crime Law Soc Change

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“…Where priorities dovetailed as in Taiwan or Korea, conflict was relatively absent (Kwon 1998). In other instances, such as India (see below) of state conflict and fragmentation between multiple developmental goals-economic, security, and industrial welfare-the theoretical problematique of late industrial development remains (Boyd and Ngo 2005;Srinivas 2008a). …”

Section: Late Industrializersmentioning

confidence: 97%

Industrial welfare and the state: nation and city reconsidered

Srinivas

2010

Theor Soc

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Industrial welfare history presents important challenges to developmental state theories in "late" industrialization. This article expands the debate by examining how nation-states create statutory welfare by addressing institutional variety beyond markets. It is simplistic to argue linear growth of national welfare or of states autonomously regulating markets to achieve risk-mitigation. I contend that welfare institutions emerge from the state's essential conflict and collaboration with various alternate institutions in cities and regions. Using histories of Europe, India, and Karnataka, I propose a place-based, work-based, and work-place based welfare typology evolving at differential rates. Although economic imperatives exist to expand local risk-pools, it is precisely the alternate institutional diversity that makes late industrial nation-states unable or unwilling to do so. This results in institutionally "thin," top-down industrial welfare. Ultimately, theories that overly depend on histories of small nations, homogenous nations, or city-states, provide weak tests of the economics of industrial welfare. The state in late industrial welfareThe study of capital accumulation has generated the most influential state theories of the twentieth century. In most, the state is posed against markets and acts as the development institution of last resort in specifying cost structures and mitigating risks during industrial transformation. This article examines the evolution of industrial welfare during "late" industrial development. I analyze the historical record of how states institute welfare and regulate markets, thus managing conflicts between production and redistribution. I consider several questions: Are traditional models of linear growth of welfare institutions appropriate for late industrializing states? What is the appropriate scale of the "state": nation, city, or region? Finally,

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“…However, the most remarkable experience of it with a successful socioeconomic transformation was recorded in the East Asian states between the 1960s and 1980s (Fritz and Menocal, 2007). The application of such a model enabled them to miraculously advance their economy and escape from the perils of poverty (Kim, 2009;Boyd and Ngo, 2005). As a result of this fact, scholars on the subject use the developmental state theory mainly to explain such a rapid industrialization and economic growth in the East Asian states, which are also referred as the Asian Tigers (Bolesta, 2007;United Nations, 2007;Boyd and Ngo, 2005).…”

Section: The Notion Of Developmental Statementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ideologically, the developmental state is neither a capitalist nor a socialist system. It, rather, lies in between a free market capitalist economic system and a centrally-planned command economic system (Bolesta, 2007;Boyd and Ngo, 2005). It borrows certain features from these diametrically opposite politicoeconomic perspectives.…”

Section: The Notion Of Developmental Statementioning

confidence: 99%

Developmental State of Ethiopia: Reflections on the Benefits Obtained and the Costs Incurred

Bayeh¹

2019

Eth. J. Soc. Sci. Hum.

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This research examines the progress achieved and the costs incurred as a result of the application of a developmental state model in Ethiopia. To this end, the researcher relied on secondary sources. Based on a thorough analysis of relevant sources, the following findings are obtained. Even though the developmental state has brought an observable level of economic growth, it has also caused several detrimental effects in other spheres: eroding the value of pluralism; endangering human rights; entrenching a single-party authoritarian rule; leading to rampant corruption; intensifying arbitrary intervention in the life of citizens. In implementing the model, the focus was on economic growth while the political aspect of it was sidelined. As a result, the researcher suggests that economic growth and political transformation (democratization) should be valued equally and pursued side-by-side, not in tandem.

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Emancipating the political economy of Asia from the growth paradigm

Cited by 10 publications

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Rent-seeking and economic governance in the structural nexus of corruption in China

Rent-seeking and economic governance in the structural nexus of corruption in China

Industrial welfare and the state: nation and city reconsidered

Developmental State of Ethiopia: Reflections on the Benefits Obtained and the Costs Incurred

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