Embedded Power System Monitoring Of Illegal Power Connections In Kenyan Domestic Supply

Pauline, N Karobia; Livingstone, Ngoo; James, M.

doi:10.1109/powerafrica49420.2020.9219799

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

References 4 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Smart meters are used to monitor the electricity usage of customers and the power consumption of various appliances, providing real-time client electricity consumption data to power grid operators so that operators can detect and solve abnormal electricity usage situations timely, reduce resource consumption, and ensure safe operation of the power grid [3]. A series of abnormal electricity usage behaviours, such as illegal power connection [4], theft [5], overload [6], and illegal power transfer [7], seriously affect the safety of load electricity usage in the power system, with electricity theft being the most prominent [8]. Therefore, the detection and analysis of abnormal electricity usage have attracted the attention of many scholars [9][10][11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of safe electricity consumption on load side based on attack and defence game model

Wang,

Gong,

Chen

et al. 2024

The Journal of Engineering

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

With the improvement of digitalization and intelligence in the power system, the safe operation of the power system is facing enormous challenges. The safe use of electricity on the load side is the key to achieving safe and reliable power system operation. The detection party needs amounts of human and material resources when the power network is attacked. In response to the current difficulties of low detection ability and high detection costs, this paper proposes an attack and defence game model that considers the differences between different nodes, ensuring the safety and economy of electricity consumption while reducing energy waste. At first, the structure of smart meters and the attack characteristics of intruders are summarized, and a basic attack and defence game model is constructed. The Nash equilibrium is then solved, and the optimal strategy for the game between the defender and the intruder is given to balance the relation between detection performance and energy consumption. In response to the differences generated by each node, strategies for attackers to launch attacks on different nodes and the setting of optimal thresholds for other nodes in the defence system are explored. Finally, case studies verify that the proposed model could reduce the cost of intruder detection while ensuring a specific detection rate.

show abstract