Embedded trust: Control and learning

Individual Strategy Update and Emergence of Cooperation in Social Networks

“…Recently, there has been a huge literature on the role of social networks in the diffusion of behaviors and opinions in a society, and a variety of mechanisms through which this influence is exerted have been identified. Examples of these mechanisms include reciprocity and territoriality (Axelrod, 1984), reputation (Raub & Weesie, 1990;Nowak & Sigmund, 1998), the establishment of a group identity (Brewer & Kramer, 1986;Kollock, 1998b), social learning (Macy, 1991), trust (Buskens & Raub, 2002), projection (Kanazawa, 2007), group reciprocity (Karp, Jin, Yamagishi, & Shinotsuka, 1993), and even group size (Olson, 1965;Dawes, 1980;Marwell & Oliver, 1993). Other mechanisms, such as choice of partners (Yamagishi, Hayashi, & Jin, 1994), cost-benefit analysis (Jackson & Wolinsky, 1996), or social plasticity (Eguiluz, Zimmermann, Cela-Conde, & San Miguel, 2005) have led to the study of dynamic social networks in which the individuals can change their links as a result of their interactions with their neighbors (see de Vos, Smaniotto, & Elsas, 2001;Newman, Barabási, & Watts 2006;or Jackson, 2008, for reviews).…”

Enhancing Multilateral Security in and by Reputation Systems

“…On the one hand entities within the reputation network can learn possible interaction partners' reputation from former interaction partners or other entities within the network who observed the possible interaction partner. In social sciences this is called the learning mechanism of the reputation network [2]. On the other hand entities within the reputation network may control others in the reputation network by spreading information about the entities' former interactions.…”

“…On the other hand entities within the reputation network may control others in the reputation network by spreading information about the entities' former interactions. In social sciences this is called the control mechanism of the reputation network [2]. Both entities and interactions within the reputation network can be reputation objects.…”

The Adaptive Rationality of Interpersonal Commitment

“…Game theory has identified repeated interaction as an important solution for the problem. In a world of harsh competition, repeated encounters reduce uncertainty about the trustworthiness of interaction partners (shadow of the past), while at the same time they create a strategic incentive for cooperation (shadow of the future) (Axelrod 1984;Buskens and Raub 2002;Friedman 1971). Thus durable relationships are expected to be a hotbed of cooperation even in the absence of central enforcement because they provide incentives both to trust others and to honor others' trust.…”