Embedding social dilemmas in intergroup competition reduces free-riding

Gunnthorsdottir, Anna; Rapoport, Anatol

doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.08.005

Cited by 119 publications

(114 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…the subject's choice space limited to a binary decision: whether to cast a vote or not. The experimental studies on group contest where subjects can make their decisions on continuous space have been recently conducted by Nalbantian and Schotter (1997), Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006), Sutter andStrassmair (2009), Abbink et al (2010), Ahn et al (2011), and Kugler et al (2010). All of these studies, however, employ perfect-substitutes contests (i.e., the performance of a group depends on the sum of individual efforts) and homogenous players (i.e., all players within the same group are identical).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests Between Groups

Sheremeta

2009

SSRN Journal

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This experiment investigates contests between groups. Each group has one strong player, with a higher valuation for the prize, and two weak players, with lower valuations. In contests where individual efforts are perfect substitutes, all players expend significantly higher efforts than predicted by theory. In best-shot contests, where group performance depends on the best performer, most of the effort is expended by strong players while weak players free-ride. In weakest-link contests, where group performance depends on the worst performer, there is almost no free-riding and all players expend similar positive efforts conforming to the group Pareto dominant equilibrium.JEL Classifications: C71, C72, C91, C92, D72, H41

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests Between Groups

Sheremeta

2009

SSRN Journal

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“…In all these studies, the prize is either non-rivalous among group members or shared equally. The only experimental studies, to the best of my knowledge, that involve the proportional sharing rule are Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006) and Kugler et al (2010). However, instead of comparing contest behavior in groups than in individuals, they study the public goods problem embedded in group contests and focus on comparisons of the impact of two di¤erent sharing rules (equal vs. proportional).…”

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confidence: 99%

Fight Alone or Together? The Need to Belong

2011

SSRN Journal

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Alliances often face both free-riding and hold-up problems, which undermine the e¤ectiveness of alliances in mobilizing joint …ghting e¤ort. Despite of these disadvantages, alliances are still ubiquitous in all types of contests. This paper asks if there are non-monetary incentives to form alliances, e.g., intimidating/discouraging the single player(s) who is/are left alone. For this purpose, I compare symmetric (2 vs. 2) and asymmetric (2 vs. 1) contests to their equivalent 4-player and 3-player individual contests, respectively.We …nd that alliance players in symmetric (2 vs. 2) contests behave the same as those in equivalent 4-player individual contests. However, in asymmetric (2 vs. 1) contests, stand-alone players were strongly discouraged to exert e¤ort (especially the females), compared to the 3-player individual contests. Alliance players may have anticipated this e¤ect and also reduced their e¤ort, if alliances share the prize according to the merit rule. Behavioural factors such as the need to belong can help reconcile the "paradox of alliance formation".

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“…As a result, cooperation (resource conservation) increases groups' chances of winning in conflict. The evidence from the contest experiments have shown that group competition leads to higher level of cooperation and lower levels of free-riding (Bornstein and Erev 1994;Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport 2006;Abbink et al 2010). However, it is difficult to say if participants contributed more under group competition to CPRs because they believed this would make them more money, or because they wanted to contribute to the group's success irrespective of financial incentives (Burton-Chellew et al 2010).…”

Section: Conclusion and Discussion Of Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If a group wins, the prize is distributed among group members equally, otherwise investments are lost. It has been shown that group competition leads to higher level of cooperation and lower levels of freeriding (Bornstein and Erev 1994;Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport 2006;Abbink et al 2010). For instance, Abbink et al (2010) find that conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are above the equilibrium.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Resource Uncertainty and Intergroup Conflict on Harvesting in the Common-Pool Resource Experiment

Safarzynska¹

2017

Environ Resource Econ

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How do resource uncertainty and intergroup conflict affect intragroup cooperation over resources in the common pool dilemmas? Does a danger of sudden resource depletion encourage random acts of violence? There are concerns that climate change will escalate conflicts over, and the scarcity of, renewable resources, which are already under threat or in a state of decline. However, we know surprisingly little about the impact of uncertainty on intergroup conflict over resources. In this paper, we present experimental evidence from a mixed design experiment with two-between-group factors: (1) the presence (or absence) of shocks that can destroy a part of resources; and (2) the availability of intergroup conflict. We find that random shocks encourage resource conservation within groups. The positive impact of resource uncertainty on resource conservation disappears in the presence of conflict. It seems that subjects protect themselves from resource exhaustion in the presence of shocks by engaging in conflict and taking resources from the out-group instead of reducing extraction. In general, conflict promotes intragroup cooperation, but this is conditional on the outcomes of past conflicts. In particular, groups harvest more after wins, and only reduce extraction after losing resources in conflict.

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Embedding social dilemmas in intergroup competition reduces free-riding

Cited by 119 publications

References 34 publications

Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests Between Groups

Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests Between Groups

Fight Alone or Together? The Need to Belong

The Impact of Resource Uncertainty and Intergroup Conflict on Harvesting in the Common-Pool Resource Experiment

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