Embodied Cognition

Shapiro, Lawrence A.

doi:10.5840/philtopics201139117

Cited by 120 publications

(71 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…In part this is because science does not have the tools to prove non-existence. Another difficulty in ruling out abstract representations is related to the philosophical concept of constitution (e.g., Shapiro, 2011). That is, as scientists we can demonstrate causal connections (e.g., between sensorimotor system activation and understanding).…”

Section: Do Non-embodied Systems Play Any Role In Cognition?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Few believe the world is flat: How embodiment is changing the scientific understanding of cognition.

Glenberg

2015

Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology / Revue canadienne

170

117

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Abstract:Science has changed many of our dearly held and commonsensical (but incorrect) beliefs. For example, few still believe the world is flat, and few still believe the sun orbits the earth. Few still believe humans are unrelated to the rest of the animal kingdom, and soon few will believe human thinking is computer-like.Instead, as with all animals, our thoughts are based on bodily experiences, and our thoughts and behaviors are controlled by bodily and neural systems of perception, action, and emotion interacting with the physical and social environments. We are embodied; nothing more. Embodied cognition is about cognition formatted in sensorimotor experience, and sensorimotor systems make those thoughts dynamic.Even processes that seem abstract, such as language comprehension and goal understanding are embodied. Thus, embodied cognition is not limited to one type of thought or another: It is cognition.3 Throughout history, careful observation and thinking-science-has changed long-held, cherished, and seemingly obvious beliefs. For example, because of science, few still believe the world is flat, although it looks that way to casual observation. Similarly, notions of human exceptionalism have a continuing history of being overthrown by science. In the sixteenth century, the idea that the heavenly bodies revolved around us on earth was challenged by Copernicus; in the seventeenth century Galileo was punished for supporting the idea, but eventually science prevailed over church dogma. In the nineteenth century, Darwin challenged the notion that humans were unrelated to other species. Science continues to support notions of evolution and the descent of humans, but even in the twenty-first century, many (including a startling large number of elected officials in the US) refuse to acknowledge evolution.Another cherished aspect of human exceptionalism is that our thinking is special. As Mahon (2014) has put it, "it is the independence of thought from perception and action that makes human cognition special…" One goal of the embodied approach to cognition is to show that this idea, although cherished and seemingly obvious, is also wrong.

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Section: Do Non-embodied Systems Play Any Role In Cognition?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Few believe the world is flat: How embodiment is changing the scientific understanding of cognition.

Glenberg

2015

Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology / Revue canadienne

170

117

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“…Embodied approaches to cognition (e.g., Clark, 1999;Shapiro, 2011) generally assume that the processes governing cognition and behavior are not solely a function of the brain, but emerge as interactions among cognition, action, and the environment (including the social environment). For example, being able to gesture freely has been linked to performance on a range of cognitive tasks, including memory (Cook, Mitchell, & Goldin-Meadow, 2008;Frick-Horbury & Guttentag, 1998;Goldin-Meadow, Nusbaum, Kelly, & Wagner, 2001;Morsella & Krauss, 2004), quantity of utterances (Morsella & Krauss, 2004), and content of utterances (Hostetter, Alibali, & Kita, 2007;Morsella & Krauss, 2004;Rauscher, Krauss, & Chen, 1996).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Movement constraints on interpersonal coordination and communication.

Tolston

Shockley

Riley

et al. 2014

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Perfor

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The present study investigated how constraining movement affects interpersonal coordination and joint cognitive performance. Pairs of participants worked cooperatively to solve picture-puzzle tasks in which they conversed to identify differences between pictures in 3 degree-of-constraint conditions: both participants were free to move their hands (free-free; FF); both participants’ hands were restrained (restrained-restrained; RR); and the hands of 1 participant were free while the hands of the other participant were restrained (free-restrained; FR). Eye tracking data were collected, and movement was measured at the waist, hand, and head. Data were analyzed using Cross-Recurrence Quantification Analysis (CRQ). Postural sway coordination, gaze coordination, and task performance were predicted to be highest in FF, followed by RR, and then by FR. Results showed the asymmetric FR condition generally exhibited lesser degrees of coordination than the symmetric Conditions FF and RR, and that the patterning of coordination in the symmetric conditions varied across the measured body segments. These results demonstrate that movement restraints affect not only interpersonal postural coordination, but also joint attention. Additionally, significant positive relationships were found between task performance and total amount of anterior-posterior movement measured at the head, hand and waist; number of utterances; and number of differences pairs found in the puzzles. These findings indicate a relationship between movement and task performance consistent with the hypotheses that both interpersonal coordination and cognitive performance are sensitive to local action constraints.

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“…The indexical hypothesis arises from a perceived inadequacy in computational accounts of meaning -the symbol grounding problem -and proceeds to develop an alternative that emphasizes the body's importance. Glenberg's indexical hypothesis is not without its critics (see Shapiro, 2011, for discussion). One might fault it for accepting too readily that computational theories of meaning really do face a symbol grounding problem.…”

Section: Deriving Meaning From the Bodymentioning

confidence: 99%

What’s New About Embodied Cognition?

Shapiro

2012

Filosofia Unisinos

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In the past twenty years, growing numbers of researchers have sought to steer cognitive science in a new direction. These researchers have emphasized the body's role in cognition. Although the precise nature of this role often receives only vague description, perfectly clear is the idea that, whatever this role, the time has come for cognitive science to abandon old conceptions of the mind in favor of something new; and formerly trusted methods for its investigation must give way to novel techniques. This article will fi rst present a brief description of the computational conception of mind against which embodied cognition typically positions itself. Following that will be a discussion of various research projects that embodied cognitivists take to challenge this computational conception. In conclusion, the chapter offers an assessment of the embodied challenge to computational cognitive science and considers its future prospects.Key words: cognition, embodied, computational, cognitive science. ResumoNos últimos vinte anos, um número crescente de pesquisadores tem procurado direcionar as ciências cognitivas em uma nova direção. Estes pesquisadores tem enfatizado o papel da corporifi cação na cognição. Embora a natureza precisa deste papel seguidamente receba apenas uma descrição vaga, é perfeitamente clara a ideia de que, qualquer que seja o papel, chegou a hora de a ciência cognitiva abandonar velhas concepções da mente em favor de algo novo; e métodos de investigação anteriormente confi ados devem dar lugar a novas técnicas. Este artigo irá primeiramente apresentar uma breve descrição da concepção computacional da mente contra a qual a cognição corporifi cada se posiciona. Seguindo isso haverá uma discussão de vários projetos de pesquisa que os cognitivistas da corporifi cação tomam para desafi ar a concepção computacional. Em conclusão, o capítulo oferece um acesso ao desafi o corporifi cado para a ciência cognitiva computacional e considera perspectivas futuras.Palavras-chave: cognição, corporifi cada, computacional, ciências cognitivas.

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Embodied Cognition

Cited by 120 publications

References 15 publications

Few believe the world is flat: How embodiment is changing the scientific understanding of cognition.

Few believe the world is flat: How embodiment is changing the scientific understanding of cognition.

Movement constraints on interpersonal coordination and communication.

What’s New About Embodied Cognition?

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