Embodied Irrationality? Knowledge Avoidance, Willful Ignorance, and the Paradox of Autonomy

Abstract

In the current philosophical and psychological literature, knowledge avoidance and willful ignorance seem to be almost identical conditions involved in irrational patterns of reasoning. In this paper, we will argue that not only these two phenomena should be distinguished, but that they also fall into different parts of the epistemic rationality-irrationality spectrum. We will adopt an epistemological and embodied perspective to propose a definition for both terms. Then, we will maintain that, while willful ignorance is involved in irrational patterns of reasoning and beliefs, knowledge avoidance should be considered epistemically rational under particular circumstances. We will begin our analysis by considering which of the two phenomena is involved in patterns of reasoning that are still amply recognized as irrational—as wishful thinking, self-deception, and akrasia. We will then discuss the impact of epistemic feelings—which are emotional events that depend on epistemic states—on agents' decision-making. Then, we will consider the impact of willful ignorance and knowledge avoidance on agents' autonomy. By considering these issues, we will argue that when agents are aware that they are avoiding certain information (and aware of what kind of feelings acquiring the information would trigger), knowledge avoidance should be considered a rational, autonomy-increasing, hope-depended selection of information.

Psychoanalytic contributions in distinguishing willful ignorance and rational knowledge avoidance

“…In the research literature, willful ignorance has an all-encompassing quality of “the general avoidance of situations that let someone aware of certain information, evidence, or knowledge” (Arfini and Magnani, 2021 , p. 4). In contrast, knowledge avoidance can be rational and relatively specific in avoiding certain information for particular reasons.…”

“…In contrast, knowledge avoidance can be rational and relatively specific in avoiding certain information for particular reasons. Arfini and Magnani ( 2021 ) write “we can say that people are willfully ignorant of something when they avoid all circumstances that would allow them to acquire that knowledge, even by accident. Instead, people in a condition of knowledge avoidance do not perform the necessary steps to get a specific piece of information” (p. 3).…”

“…Recognizing this propensity, Suzy now tries to be prudent in her use of social media and has decided for the next few months to try an experiment by not checking any notifications of feedback from any of her social media posts. This is an example of rational knowledge avoidance, since it describes “a condition in which agents avoid some knowledge to refrain from anticipated costs (in terms of pain, anxiety, or regret) of possessing it…In these situations, people avoid acquiring those pieces of information that would impact their emotional state, reasoning abilities, and decisions” (Arfini and Magnani, 2021 , p. 6). In this case, Suzy is cognizant of her propensity to relapse into a social media addiction that seeks flattery that is fueled by an inner sense of lack or inner deficiency (Naranjo, 1994 ).…”

“…The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes that “self-deception involves a person who seems to acquire and maintain some false belief in the teeth of evidence to the contrary as a consequence of some motivation, and who may display behavior suggesting some awareness of the truth” (Deweese-Boyd, 2021 ). In the midst of exploring the nature of self-deception, there is an attempt to distinguish between willful ignorance and rational knowledge avoidance since the latter can be useful, arguably beneficial in some cases (Arfini and Magnani, 2021 ) and can assist in overcoming self-deception. Although the nuanced distinction between willful ignorance and rational knowledge avoidance is interesting and helpful, there are gaps explaining the different psychological processes occurring in one compared to the other.…”

Fan responses to ownership change in the English Premier League: Motivated ignorance, social creativity and social competition at Newcastle United F.C.

“…One further identity-maintenance strategy that has yet to receive attention within the sport fan literature is that of ‘motivated ignorance’ (Williams, 2021). The broader concept of ignorance has been neglected in academic research (Hertwig and Engel, 2016), and is more nuanced than it might initially seem, with several forms (Arfini and Magnani, 2021), and diverse functions (Smithson, 1985). Motivated ignorance is a specific form of ignorance that is actively and purposefully cultivated, rather than being ignorance that occurs through factors such as lack of either awareness of, or access to information (Hartford, 2022).…”