Embodied Judgment in Hannah Arendt: From Boethius and Huck Finn to Transnational Feminisms

Abstract

Feminists have found Arendt helpful in articulating a theory of judgment across cultural differences. Embodiment enters this discussion, usually, through attention to enlarged mentality. In contrast, I approach embodiment and judgment by looking at undertheorized connections with Arendt’s conception of “thinking.” Drawing on a discussion of Boethius and Huckleberry Finn, I suggest that persons are led to thinking (and to judgment) by lived contradictions, that is, by instances in which their experiences cannot be interpreted through dominant norms in their society or culture. I also consider a claim that oppression hinders a person’s ability to be receptive to enlarged mentality, thus making it difficult for oppressed persons in Third World contexts to exercise judgment. In response, I examine how an oppressed person is receptive to meaning-making through negotiating lived contradictions.

Commercial Contract Pregnancy in India, Judgment, and Resistance to Oppression

“… Elsewhere I argue that judgments may be prompted when dominant and widely held social beliefs fail to help a woman make sense of her own situation (Fulfer ). …”