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Orientation and Theoretical BackgroundWe introduce here a special issue of this journal on the theme of "Conceptual Metaphor and Embodied Cognition in Science Learning." The idea for this issue grew out of a symposium that we organized on this topic at the conference of the European Science Education Research Association (ESERA) in September 2013. The eight papers collected in this issue reflect the emergence of a critical mass of studies in science education applying ideas from the perspective of "embodied cognition" in cognitive science. Up until the 1980s, most research in cognitive science assumed a view of the mind as an abstract information processing system. On this view, our sensorimotor systems were often seen as serving a peripheral, input/output role, conveying information to or from a central cognitive processor where abstract, higher level thought took place. The research focused on developing models of cognition incorporating language-like, propositional representations and syntactic processes, and largely ignored the specifics of human physiology and interaction between the person and the material and social world in which he or she thinks and acts. Since then, several different approaches to cognitive science have adopted some version of the assumption that cognition is embodied -that is, they have assumed that models of cognition need to attend to the characteristics of human brains and bodies, and the material contexts in which thought is taking place (e.g. Barsalou, 2008;Clark & Chalmers, 1998;Shapiro, 2011; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991;Wilson, 2002) Wilson (2002) carefully distinguishes and assesses six distinct claims that fall under the general heading of embodied cognition: (1) that cognitive processes are situated, varying depending on the real-world contexts in which they are carried out;(2) that cognitive processes must be understood with respect to the specific temporal 5 constraints imposed on our brains by the environment when cognitive tasks are carried out; (3) that cognitive processes recruit the material, symbolic and social structure of the environment, reducing what actually needs to be performed in the mind itself; (4) that cognitive systems can be viewed as extended, where there is no sharp divide between internal and external contributions to cognition; (5) that the function of cognition is not primarily to represent the external world but to guide action in it; (6) that even cognition that takes place in the "mind" proper relies on knowledge structures that emerge from body-based experiences. This introduction is not the place for a discussion of Wilson's evaluation of these claims. We simply note that she finds the fourth claim "deeply problematic" but cautiously accepts the first three and fifth claims, suggesting that the range of applicability of each still needs to be more fully assessed.The sixth claim she considers to be the most powerful of all the claims and reviews evidence suggesting that body-based cognitive representations and processes ground a wide ran...