Embodied Self-Respect and the Fragility of Human Dignity: A Human Rights Approach

Human dignity as an essentially contested concept

“…This view, contrary to Neal's claim (2014, 31), is present in the international case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the aforementioned 'dignified life' doctrine as well as in various constitutional documents, notably the Basic Laws of Israel, Article 10 of the Bill of Rights of the South African Constitution and Article 1(1) of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. Several authors also speak of a right to dignity (Dworkin 1993;Pollmann 2011). But this position brings us back to the critique made of Dupré's position, since it does not make any sense, despite what some authors assert (Waldron 2007;, 18 to claim that dignity is a right and that dignity is already intrinsic in all human beings (Carozza 2008, 937;O'Mahony 2012a, 562 -563).…”

Three Circles of Dignity

“…It is said, for instance, that dignity 'refers to' an intrinsic value (Andorno 2009: 233) which therefore recalls why dignity is recognized, rather than what dignity is. On the latter question, legal commentators have provided different definitions, seeing 'human dignity' as a 'type of value' (Rosen 2012: 19-23); a 'need' (Shultziner and Rabinovici 2012: 107); 'normative property' (Birnbacher 1996: 118); a 'potential' (Pollmann 2010); or a 'process' (Lickiss 2007). Waldron has argued that dignity must be identified with a 'status' (Waldron 2013: 24-7)-a perspective that others have criticized (Rosen 2009) or further explored (Beitz 2009: 283-8).…”