Embracing market and civic actor participation in public rental housing governance: new insights about power distribution

Yan, Juan; Haffner, Marietta; Elsinga, Marja

doi:10.1080/02673037.2020.1813258

Cited by 9 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…The relationships among governments and non-governmental actors might further hinder the Chongqing government to improve PRH housing quality. This is due to that the investment organisations, as the main implementers of PRH construction, are viewed as an extended part of the government bureaucracy, rather than as commercial entities (Yan et al, 2020;Zhou & Ronald, 2017a), as one of the interviewees stated:…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Chongqing, local government has encountered financial constraints as well as human resource constraints in terms of the implementation of Grid Governance (Yan et al, 2020). Consequently, local government requires Residents' Committees, establishes Hongguanjia Property Management Alliance, and hires property management companies to help manage PRH neighbourhood.…”

Section: Prh Governance: Tenant Communicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Effective Public Rental Housing governance: tenants’ perspective from the pilot city Chongqing, China

Yan

Haffner

Elsinga

2021

J Hous and the Built Environ

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In the past decade, Public Rental Housing (PRH) has become the program of providing affordable rental housing to low- and middle-income households in China. Even though descriptions of the governance results are numerous, the previous studies are not underpinned by a theoretical foundation from a governance perspective, nor have they empirically examined whether PRH governance works on the ground. This explorative and empirical paper aims to fill this gap of an outcome-oriented evaluation of the impacts of governance as perceived by the final user. Central government formulated the objective for PRH governance as maintaining stability in the society. Whether the tenants perceive the goal of social stability as achieved was measured along three governance outcome dimensions: satisfaction with housing quality, satisfaction with housing quantity, and willingness to communicate with the government about PRH governance. Data were collected from questionnaires to PRH-tenants in Chongqing, the most important pilot city of PRH provision in China. The findings show that the perceived governance outcomes were quite mixed as tenants were moderately satisfied with PRH housing quantity, but less satisfied with housing quality, and thought they could relatively easily communicate with local government. In view of these mixed outcomes, to strengthen the effectiveness of PRH governance in the eyes of the tenants, this study suggests local governments: (1) to rethink and redevelop the performance evaluation; (2) to rethink the relations with non-governmental actors and organise a monitoring system that will assist in optimizing housing quality; and (3) to facilitate tenants’ communication with local government.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Prh Governance: Tenant Communicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effective Public Rental Housing governance: tenants’ perspective from the pilot city Chongqing, China

Yan

Haffner

Elsinga

2021

J Hous and the Built Environ

Self Cite

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“…As quasipublic good, the supply of GSRH cannot and does not need to be fully borne by the government; however, as the executive department of state power, the government is fully responsible for guiding the supply of GSRH and has always been one of the main suppliers. Government participants rely on hierarchical guidance, mainly acting as nonprofit entities [ 23 ]. For the supply of GSRH, the state is at the top of the hierarchy, with the central government setting national supply policies and tasks and local governments acting as intermediaries responsible for establishing specific methods for local policy, project development and implementation, and negotiating with other actors to achieve housing construction and distribution [ 17 , 50 ].…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some scholars hold that the private sector has financial and professional advantages and can share risks with the public sector, reduce operating costs, introduce competition, increase options, and improve service quality [ 21 , 22 ]. Using nongovernmental resources can create a more flexible structure to quickly adapt to rapidly changing environments [ 23 ]. Public-private partnerships (PPP) are widely seen as a way to involve the private sector with rich capital and management experience in sharing the financial burden of governments and improving the efficiency and sustainability of the public housing supply [ 24 , 25 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Collaborative Supply Mechanism of Government-Subsidized Rental Housing from the Perspective of Tripartite Evolutionary Game in Metropolitan Cities of China

Liu

Dong

Cui

et al. 2022

Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience

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With the advancement of urbanisation, the inflow of population in China’s large cities has been increasing and the demand for rental housing of “new citizens” with insufficient housing affordability has become increasingly strong. Therefore, the Chinese government proposes to provide government-subsidized rental housing (GSRH) different from public rental housing. At present, the supply mode of public rental housing in China is mainly government construction and operation, which has the problems of low supply efficiency and low service level. It is critical to explore an efficient supply model in the construction of the GSRH system. Therefore, this study, starting from the three supply subjects of government, market, and society, constructs an evolutionary game model and uses agent-based modelling simulation to explore how multisubjects achieve optimal collaboration in the supply process of GSRH. The results are as follows: First, the development of a collaborative supply system includes four stages: noncooperative behaviour, collaborative exploration, collaborative game, and three-subject collaborative supply. Second, the government is the core of realising multisubject coordination. Increasing government supervision will boost market participation, while increasing government subsidies can fully mobilise the enthusiasm of social subjects but cannot continuously improve the market’s enthusiasm. Third, increasing the participation ratio of social subjects will help mobilise the enthusiasm of other subjects to participate, while the excessive participation ratio of market subjects may cause an imbalance in the collaborative supply system. This study provides theoretical support for the efficient supply of GSRH.

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Sustainable low-income housing: Exploring housing and governance issues in the Gauteng City Region, South Africa

Mhlongo,

Gumbo,

Musonda

et al. 2024

Urban Governance

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Embracing market and civic actor participation in public rental housing governance: new insights about power distribution

Abstract: Elsinga (2020): Embracing market and civic actor participation in public rental housing governance: new insights about power distribution, Housing Studies,

Cited by 9 publications

References 51 publications

Effective Public Rental Housing governance: tenants’ perspective from the pilot city Chongqing, China

Effective Public Rental Housing governance: tenants’ perspective from the pilot city Chongqing, China

Collaborative Supply Mechanism of Government-Subsidized Rental Housing from the Perspective of Tripartite Evolutionary Game in Metropolitan Cities of China

Sustainable low-income housing: Exploring housing and governance issues in the Gauteng City Region, South Africa

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