Emergence and Evolution of Meaning: The General Definition of Information (GDI) Revisiting Program—Part I: The Progressive Perspective: Top-Down

Abstract

In this first part of the paper, the category of meaning is traced starting from the origin of the Universe itself as well as its very grounding in pre-geometry (the second part deals with an appropriate bottom-up approach). In contrast to many former approaches in the theories of information and also in biosemiotics, we will show that the forms of meaning emerge simultaneously (alongside) with information and energy. Hence, information can be visualized as being always meaningful (in a sense to be explicated) rather than visualizing meaning as a later specification of information within social systems only. This perspective taken has two immediate consequences: (1) We follow the GDI as defined by Floridi, though we modify it somehow as to the aspect of truthfulness. (2) We can conceptually solve Capurro’s trilemma. Hence, what we actually do is to follow the strict (i.e., optimistic) line of UTI in the sense of Hofkirchner’s. While doing this, we treat energy and information as two different categorial aspects of one and the same underlying primordial structure. We thus demonstrate the presently developing convergence of physics, biology, and computer science (as well as the various theories of information) in some detail and draft out a line of argument eventually leading up to the further unification of UTI and biosemiotics

Emergence and Evolution of Meaning: The General Definition of Information (GDI) Revisiting Program—Part 2: The Regressive Perspective: Bottom-up

“…As we argued in the first part [2] and recalled above, at each level of the hierarchy of complexity the co-operating parties produce an action whose course constitutes the meaning of the corresponding agency. This meaning produces in nature new regularities, new classicities on the upper levels, which are emergent in both ontological and epistemological senses; ontologically emergent, because they represent properties which are not reducible to the mere superposition of the properties of the involved parties, but essentially dependent on the rules of interaction; epistemologically, because these regularities constitute the environmental uniformities that agents-at the macrolevel-can sense.…”

“…2) where we comparatively analyze the limits of the sensing apparatus with respect to the previously investigated limits of the manifestation of objects, showing that animal vision (unlike Floridi's stagnated observables, as argued in [2], Section 3) is very well adapted to the physical limits of the manifestation of objects, though biased by the leeway and constraints of the evolutionary path (in turn dependent of the evolution of autonomous agency; In the first part of our GDI revisiting programme [2], we have generalized Kaufmann's concept of autonomous agency throughout the hierarchy of complexity. See Kauffman's works [4][5][6]).…”

“…This minimal distance can also be regarded as the size of the smallest perceivable details (or heterogeneities). (ii) The maximal Kolmogorov complexity of the field produced by a source within a ball or radius a is limited to N = 32π(τa/λ) 2 (complexity theorem for radiation field), where τ ≥ 1 stands for an excess of the maximal spatial frequencies with respect to 2π/λ at , related to the relative presence of evanescent modes in the vicinity of the object. Concerning this maximal complexity, it is interesting to point out, on the one hand, that no matter how big the complexity of the object is, the field distribution surrounding the object cannot be bigger than N; on the other hand, that such complexity depends on a 2 , thus on the area of the surrounding boundary, not on its volume; consequently, the ambiguity provided by the radiation of the object with respect to its volumetric structure corresponds to one dimension (see note [13]).…”

“…It is important to highlight that many of the concepts here used and the criticism to Floridi's approach are properly addressed in the first part [2]), we offered an alternative to Floridi's epistemological account of emergence of meaning, in which a progressive perspective was provided based on current insights of physics and the understanding of agency throughout the hierarchy of complexity from fundamental agents-at the pre-geometrical level-to physical systems, organisms, cognition, consciousness and societies. This vision enabled us, on the one hand, to regard energy and information as two fundamental aspects of the same underlying structure of the world, related to the potentiality of realization or selection of changes, respectively (which are, in turn, dynamically and evolutionary actualized in matter and structure, respectively); on the other hand, to consider the emergence of autonomous agency as comprising at the same time: meanings (as the courses of efficient and functional actions with respect to eventual interactions within its context, embodied in constraints which enable the driving of work) and information (as what enables the selection of courses of action for both the fulfillment of agent's needs and the participation in natural games within its context) [2]. Furthermore, as we have stated, observation occurs at a given level of interaction within the hierarchy of complexity and therefore observables-unlike Floridi [3]-belong, at the same time, to an ontological and epistemological level ( [2], Section 5).…”

“…This vision enabled us, on the one hand, to regard energy and information as two fundamental aspects of the same underlying structure of the world, related to the potentiality of realization or selection of changes, respectively (which are, in turn, dynamically and evolutionary actualized in matter and structure, respectively); on the other hand, to consider the emergence of autonomous agency as comprising at the same time: meanings (as the courses of efficient and functional actions with respect to eventual interactions within its context, embodied in constraints which enable the driving of work) and information (as what enables the selection of courses of action for both the fulfillment of agent's needs and the participation in natural games within its context) [2]. Furthermore, as we have stated, observation occurs at a given level of interaction within the hierarchy of complexity and therefore observables-unlike Floridi [3]-belong, at the same time, to an ontological and epistemological level ( [2], Section 5). This onto-epistemic stance offers, indeed, a ground for the regressive perspective we are intending in this second part.…”