Emergence of alternative offspring care patterns from the evolution of parental negotiation strategies

Abstract

The evolution of parental cooperation is challenging to explain because caring for offspring is costly, and parents face an evolutionary conflict of interests over how much care each should contribute. Evolutionary game theory suggests that this conflict may be resolved through parental negotiation, where the parents make their care level dependent on the care provided by their partner. However, mathematical negotiation models typically predict a low level of parental cooperation. As these models are not dynamically explicit and tend to neglect stochasticity, we here investigate the evolution of parental negotiation strategies by means of individual-based simulations. Our results differ markedly from earlier analytical predictions. Parental negotiation strategies readily evolve, but replicate simulations result in four alternative care patterns: uniparental care, sex-biased care and egalitarian biparental care with constant or oscillatory care levels. Hence, pronounced sex differences in parental care can evolve even in the absence of sexual selection and uncertainty of paternity. Effective parental cooperation is the most frequent outcome, but in contrast to the earlier models, it is not based on parental compensation but on a tit-for-tat negotiation strategy. Actually, compensation destabilises cooperation and leads to less effective outcomes where one parental sex exploits the other one.