2010
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1671446
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Emergence of Rating Agencies: Implications for Establishing a Regional Rating Agency in Asia

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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“…Laffont and Tirole (1993) also states that the adverse selection and moral hazard problem under a single model in a social optimal contract case makes the agent to invest in an efficient manner and to obtain positive rent which otherwise in an inefficient case gives the opposite outcome. Tsai (2007) examines the mechanism design literature further and states that linear payoff contract where there is a fixed payoff and performance-based payoff component could be replicated using two incentive schemes price cap and cost of services in regulated contracts. Finally the study by Mathios and Rogers (1989) investigated the effect of price cap and cost of services on average intra state telephone rates and find in states where price caps were adopted lower rates were charged for cost of service delivery…”
Section: Theory and Methodologymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Laffont and Tirole (1993) also states that the adverse selection and moral hazard problem under a single model in a social optimal contract case makes the agent to invest in an efficient manner and to obtain positive rent which otherwise in an inefficient case gives the opposite outcome. Tsai (2007) examines the mechanism design literature further and states that linear payoff contract where there is a fixed payoff and performance-based payoff component could be replicated using two incentive schemes price cap and cost of services in regulated contracts. Finally the study by Mathios and Rogers (1989) investigated the effect of price cap and cost of services on average intra state telephone rates and find in states where price caps were adopted lower rates were charged for cost of service delivery…”
Section: Theory and Methodologymentioning
confidence: 99%