Emergency powers and the pandemic: Reflecting on state legislative reforms and the future of public health response

Abstract

The first 2 years of combatting the COVID-19 pandemic necessitated an unprecedented use of emergency powers. States responded with an equally unprecedented flurry of legislative changes to the legal underpinnings of emergency response and public health authorities. In this article, we provide a brief background on the framework and use of governors and state health officials’ emergency powers. We then analyze several key themes, including both the enhancement and restriction of powers, emerging from emergency management and public health legislation introduced in state and territorial legislatures. During the 2020 and 2021 state and territorial legislative sessions, we tracked legislation related to the emergency powers of governors and state health officials. Legislators introduced hundreds of bills impacting these powers, some enhancing and others restricting emergency powers. Enhancements included increasing vaccine access and expanding the pool of eligible medical professions that could administer vaccinations, strengthening public health investigation and enforcement authority for state agencies, and preclusion of local orders by orders at the state level. Restrictions included establishing oversight mechanisms for executive actions, limits on the duration of the emergency, limiting the scope of emergency powers allowed during a declared emergency, and other restraints. By describing these legislative trends, we hope to inform governors, state health officials, policymakers, and emergency managers about how changes in the law may impact future public health and emergency response capabilities. Understanding this new legal landscape is critical to effectively preparing for future threats.

Intervention and information effects at the individual level during the COVID-19 pandemic in Japan

“…The estimation results based on the random-effects model are summarized in Table 3. The dependent variable in columns ( 1)-( 4) is a dummy that took a value of 1 if all five prevention measures were adopted, while it was a telework dummy in columns ( 5)- (8). Columns ( 1)-( 4)…”

“…Next, columns ( 5)- (8) show that the declaration of an SOE increased the probability of adopting telework by 7.6 to 8.4%, while the coefficients of the quasi-SOE were not significant. These results indicate that a decision to conduct telework largely depended on an SOE PLOS ONE declaration.…”

“…An SOE and quasi-SOE allow prefecture governments to take stock of emergency measures to curb the spread of COVID-19, such as refraining from unnecessary and nonurgent going out, reducing the business hours of restaurants and bars, and adopting telework to reduce the movement of the population. However, unlike countries such as Australia [7], the UK [8] and the US [9], a specificity of the Japanese SOE and quasi-SOE is the fact that only recommendations and not mandates can be adopted. A clear example of this difference is the fact that Japan did not adopt lockdown policies and recommended only that businesses close and the population stay at home.…”

Laws Governing State Health Official Appointments: A Legal and Historical Review

“…Recently, numerous states have proposed limitations on public health authorities, including those of SHOs. 24 Furthermore, at least one state has removed individuals with public health expertise from required boards that provide oversight for public health. 25 In this current environment, it is plausible that some states may seek to revise the laws that govern SHO appointments and their required qualifications.…”

“…Since the start of the pandemic, an array of legislative actions have been taken by states. Recently, numerous states have proposed limitations on public health authorities, including those of SHOs 24. Furthermore, at least one state has removed individuals with public health expertise from required boards that provide oversight for public health 25.…”