Emergency preparedness planning in developed countries: the Swedish case

Abstract

Purpose -To understand the needs of the supply-chain network when coping with permanent and temporary demands, this paper analyzes the Swedish emergency preparedness supply-chain network. This network comprises planning procedures and resources, as well as numerous organizations and other participants in civil society that take part in the system to cope with threats and ongoing crises. Planning constitutes a critical infrastructure because the system must develop the ability to shift supply chain functions from permanent to temporary networks in ongoing crises and war. Design/methodology/approach -A research study is performed based on data gathered by three qualitative methods concerning the supply-chain network of emergency preparedness planning. Findings -This study demonstrates the relevance of a wide empirical field challenging several theoretical perspectives of the supply-chain network in preparedness planning and the shift to ongoing crises. Further research targeting key capabilities is needed to further improve understanding of the challenges for developed countries in managing potential threats and crises. Conclusions -Actors taking part in the preparedness system have found it challenging to coordinate. Due, in part, to the lack of a common threat profile, key capabilities remain outside preparedness planning, e.g., military, commercial and voluntary actors as well as unclear and inconsistent regulations. Thus, building the supply-chain network demonstrates the need to target the military, the voluntary and commercial sectors and their ability to develop the networks in preparedness planning. In a reformed system, all actors must strengthen civil defense in an all-hazard approach, which in planning encompasses the entire threat scale, demonstrating key functions and the ability to shift to temporary networks responding to ongoing crises, including war.

Developing relationship management strategies in a network context

“…To respond effectively to exigencies, irms need to have a deep understanding of the underlying structure of their systems and how various actors are related to their systems (Hearnshaw & Wilson, 2013). If irms seek to adapt to the necessary changes, they need to re-conceptualize their SCs from simple linear systems towards more complex systems (Hearnshaw & Wilson, 2013;Kaneberg, Hertz, & Jensen, 2016;Touboulic, Chicksand, & Walker, 2014). Hearnshaw and Wilson (2013) argue that this re-conceptualization is important as a complex system can be modeled by numerous actors and interactions among them, not in the simple pattern of a few directed relations.…”

The role of minimum supply and social vulnerability assessment for governing critical infrastructure failure: current gaps and future agenda

“…Economic impacts make for the predominant emphasis in such assessments (e.g., Oh et al, 2010b;Chopra and Khanna, 2015;Pant et al, 2016;Critical 5, 2015) as, for example, in the case of the Fukushima event in 2011 (UNISDR, 2017;Urlainis et al, 2014;Pescaroli and Kelman, 2017). Another emphasis is put on the need for improved preparedness in these countries (e.g., Kaneberg et al, 2016). Papers on disasters in developing countries (e.g., the earthquake in Haiti) focus on humanitarian impacts from CI failure (e.g., Oh et al, 2013;Urlainis et al, 2014;Pescaroli and Kelman, 2017).…”

“…Challenges and gaps detected are hardly related to CI "hardware" but focus on lacking or insufficient policies, improving individual and state preparedness to CI disruptions and the shortcomings of a limited technological perspective on CI. Policy challenges, such as the difficulties in coordinating CI among EU countries and unclear responsibilities, are addressed in both policy documents (CEPS, 2010;EC, 2006EC, , 2008EC, , 2012EC, , 2013aEC, , 2016a and research papers (Van Aaken and Wildhaber, 2015; Kaneberg et al, 2016;Rehak et al, 2016;Kitagawa et al, 2016), potentially resulting in murky responsibilities with unclear risk burdens and liability in crisis situations, as Van Aaken and Wildhaber (2015) describe it for the German context. Sage et al (2015) call for a socioecological understanding of infrastructure instead of focusing only on structural and technological stability.…”

Linking critical infrastructure resilience to social vulnerability through minimum supply concepts: review of gaps and development of an integrative framework

“…Another emphasis is put on the need for improved preparedness in these countries (e.g. Kaneberg et al 2016). Papers on disasters in developing countries (e.g.…”