Emergentism and supervenience physicalism

Howell, Robert J.

doi:10.1080/00048400802215398

Cited by 60 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…I will now consider these mysteries in more detail and how the 7 Cameron and Barnes (2007: 28) appear to regard this as a benefit: emergenceT, they write, permits one to remain "blissfully neutral" on whether emergent properties supervene on other properties. In contrast, Howell 2009, Kim 1999, McLaughlin 1992, and van Cleve 1990 take supervenience to be a constitutive aspect of emergence, and seem to suppose that this is how emergence was understood in the classic discussions in Alexander 1920, Broad 1925, and elsewhere. See Section 3 for related discussion.…”

Section: Truthmaking Dependence and The Mysteries Of Emergencementioning

confidence: 99%

Truthmaking and the Mysteries of Emergence

Morris¹

2018

Oxford Scholarship Online

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This chapter discusses and evaluates the role of truthmaking in articulating an unproblematic concept of emergence—specifically, the proposal that emergent properties should be characterized as those that, while “ontologically dependent”, are yet needed as truthmakers. It argues that while emergence so understood appears to avoid several well-known concerns about emergence and emergent properties, including those that stem from the alleged “brute determination” of emergent properties, this result is secured through the weak notion of dependence that it employs. The appeal to truthmaking, in contrast, proves largely superfluous. While truthmaking may thus not be able to play a significant role in emergentist metaphysics, it is argued that it is consistent with this verdict that truthmaking can play a more significant role in characterizing an attractive middle ground between reductive and nonreductive approaches to physicalism.

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Section: Truthmaking Dependence and The Mysteries Of Emergencementioning

confidence: 99%

Truthmaking and the Mysteries of Emergence

Morris¹

2018

Oxford Scholarship Online

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“…3 For approaches to physicalism that appeal to relations like supervenience, realization, and constitution, see Boyd (1980), Chalmers (1996), Howell (2009), Jackson (1998, Levine (2001), Loewer (2001), Melnyk (2003), Pereboom (2011), Putnam (1967, Shoemaker (2007), Tye (1995), and Wilson (2005). The label ''nonreductive'' is imperfect, due to different uses of ''reduction'' as well as disagreement about the consequences of understanding physicalism in terms of these relations.…”

Section: Physicalism and Levels Of Reality: A Role For Truthmaking?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Physicalism, Truthmaking, and Levels of Reality: Prospects and Problems

Morris

2016

Topoi

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This paper considers the extent to which the notion of truthmaking can play a substantive role in defining physicalism. While a truthmaking-based approach to physicalism is prima facie attractive, there is some reason to doubt that truthmaking can do much work when it comes to understanding physicalism, and perhaps austere metaphysical frameworks in general. First, despite promising to dispense with higher-level properties and states, truthmaking appears to make little progress on issues concerning higher-level items and how they are related to how things are physically. Second, it seems that truthmaking-based approaches to physicalism will have a difficult time addressing the status of truthmaking itself without, in effect, appealing to the resources of alternative ways of conceptualizing physicalism.

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“…3 For a discussion of supervenience as minimal physicalism, see Kim (1998), 14-15. Jessica Wilson (2005 argues that supervenience alone is insufficient for physicalism, but see Bennett (2008), Howell (2009, and Morris (2014) for further discussion. Recently, Barbara Montero (2013) has argued that supervenience is not even necessary for physicalism.…”

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confidence: 98%

Causal Overdetermination and Modal Compatibilism

Sharpe

2015

Philosophia

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Compatibilists respond to the problem of causal exclusion for nonreductive physicalism by rejecting the exclusionist's ban on overdetermination. By the compatibilist's lights there are two forms of overdetermination, one that's problematic and another that is entirely benign. Furthermore, multiple causation by Btightly relatedĉ auses requires only the benign form of overdetermination. Call this the tight relation strategy for avoiding problematic forms of overdetermination. To justify the tight relation strategy, modal compatibilists appeal to a widely accepted counterfactual test. The argument of this paper is that the counterfactual test fails to legitimize the tight relation strategy as it fails to adequately distinguish between problematic and benign overdetermination. Contrary to modal compatibilists, modal dependence does not suffice for benignity. I conclude by arguing that adequately addressing overdetermination worries requires a much heavier metaphysical burden than modal compatibilists have typically recognized.

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Emergentism and supervenience physicalism

Cited by 60 publications

References 31 publications

Truthmaking and the Mysteries of Emergence

Truthmaking and the Mysteries of Emergence

Physicalism, Truthmaking, and Levels of Reality: Prospects and Problems

Causal Overdetermination and Modal Compatibilism

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