Emerging multiple issue e-auctions

Teich, Jeffrey E.; Wallenius, Hannele; Wallenius, Jyrki; Koppius, Otto

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2003.05.001

Cited by 97 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…RFQ systems use the Internet to improve the searching and matching process between buyers and sellers in general. [18], [24] and [25] provide surveys as well as suggest mechanisms that combine multi-attribute negotiation and auction systems.…”

Section: Relation To the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

A Sealed-Bid Two-Attribute Yardstick Auction Without Prior Scoring

2015

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We analyze a two-attribute single item procurement auction that uses yardstick competition to settle prices. The auction simplifies the procurement process by reducing the principal's articulation of preferences to simply choosing the most preferred offer as if it was a market with posted prices. This is done simply by replacing the submitted sealed bids by yardstick bids, computed by a linear weighting of the other participants' bids.We show that there is only one type of Nash equilibria where some agents may win the auction by submitting a zero price-bid. Using a simulation study we demonstrate that following this type of equilibrium behavior often leads to winner's curse. The simulations show that in auctions with more than 12 participants the chance of facing winner's curse is around 95%.Truthful reporting, on the other hand, does not constitute a Nash equilibrium but it is ex post individually rational. Using a simulation study we demonstrate that truthful bidding may indeed represent some kind of

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Section: Relation To the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

A Sealed-Bid Two-Attribute Yardstick Auction Without Prior Scoring

2015

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“…At the beginning of the auction, the auctioneer may announce the method of selecting winners described by , so 1 M can induce bidders to announce their actual costs truthfully to raise their scores.…”

Section: Winner Selection Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…All suppliers are risk neutral, and all want to maximize their expected utilities. Without loss of generality, we select the following four attributes in the auction, i.e., p (price of per ton electric coal, in yuan/ton), q (supply quantity, in ton), 1 A (tvdaf, in percentage), 2 A (calorific value, in kcal/g), where Tvdaf is the core index to distinguish the combustion characteristic for electric coal. The higher the value of Tvdaf is, the easier it is on fire.…”

Section: An Application Examplementioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, most procurement mechanisms are proposed only on the base of the traditional single price auction without considering other non-price attributes (such as development cycle, delivery time, different quality parameters, service quality, and suppliers' reputation). It has seriously restricted the further applications for auctions in electronic commerce [1]. In practice electronic commerce, the procurement actives usually involve many other dimensions in addition to the price [2][3][4][5][6].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Optimization Decision Method for Procuring Divisible Goods

Rao¹,

Wu²

2012

IJCIS

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The procurement decision problem of divisible goods is investigated, and an optimization decision method for procuring a kind of divisible goods (such as coal, oil, electricity, gas, etc.) is presented based on multi-attribute auction. Firstly, the procurement decision problem of divisible goods is converted into a multi-attribute auction of divisible goods. Correspondingly, several important assumptions of multi-attribute procurement auction are given, and the buyer's utility function and the supplier's utility function are defined. Secondly, the scoring rules and bidding rules are given. And aiming at maximizing the buyer's expected utility, an optimization decision model of selecting the suppliers in multi-attribute auction is established. By solving this model, the optimal suppliers and the optimal allocation strategies are obtained. Thirdly, the suppliers' optimal bidding strategies are discussed, and the feasibility of multi-attribute auction mechanism is proved. Lastly, a multi-attribute auction example about the electric coal procurement is given to demonstrate the availability and rationality of our procurement decision method.

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“…(see Teich et al 2004). If the instructor wishes to incorporate such multiple issues into the game, the advanced features of the Negotiauction software support it.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Bread/Flour/Grain Trading Game: Bidding in and Designing Auction Events

Teich

Wallenius²,

Wallenius³

2005

INFORMS Transactions on Education

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S trategic sourcing and more specifically, e-procurement have become part of standard industry practice in recent years with the use of forward and reverse auction events. Training materials and games to teach participants to bid in and design such events, however, has been limited. In this paper we describe a Bread/Flour/Grain trading game we developed for instructors to use with student groups. We also provide accompanying materials and suggestions for running and debriefing of the game. The game imparts design and bidding experience, which students can then apply to real world auction events. It is appropriate for group sizes ranging from six to sixty.

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Emerging multiple issue e-auctions

Cited by 97 publications

References 33 publications

A Sealed-Bid Two-Attribute Yardstick Auction Without Prior Scoring

A Sealed-Bid Two-Attribute Yardstick Auction Without Prior Scoring

Optimization Decision Method for Procuring Divisible Goods

The Bread/Flour/Grain Trading Game: Bidding in and Designing Auction Events

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