Emotional Intentionality and the Attitude‐content Distinction

Mitchell, Jonathan

doi:10.1111/papq.12270

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 60 publications

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“…On a less standard approach, instead, they are somehow 'built into' the attitude toward a content (e.g., Deonna & Teroni 2012;2015;Kriegel 2015;2017;Grzankowski 2020). A third option construes the experience of evaluative properties involved in emotion as escaping a description in terms of the traditional attitude-content distinction (e.g., Mitchell 2019). Taking a stance on this debate is orthogonal to our present discussion and we intend to remain neutral on these issues.…”

Section: Fear As Experience Of Dangerousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fear of the Past

Bordini

Torrengo

2023

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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A widespread (and often tacit) assumption is that fear is an anticipatory emotion and, as such, inherently future-oriented. Prima facie, such an assumption is threatened by cases where we seem to be afraid of things in the past: if it is possible to fear the past, then fear entertains no special relation with the future—or so some have argued. This seems to force us to choose between an account of fear as an anticipatory emotion (supported by pre-theoretical intuitions as well as empirical research in psychology) and admitting cases of past-oriented fear. In this paper, we argue for a proposal that dissolves this dilemma. Our claim is: with the right account in place, the future-orientation of fear can be made compatible with, and is actually explanatory of, cases where we are genuinely afraid of something in the past. So, there is no need to choose: fear is still future-oriented, even when we are genuinely afraid of things in the past. The key is a correct understanding of what fear’s temporal orientation amounts to, and the framework we offer here provides us with such an understanding.

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Section: Fear As Experience Of Dangerousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fear of the Past

Bordini

Torrengo

2023

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Affective representation and affective attitudes

Mitchell

2019

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Many philosophers have understood the representational dimension of affective states along the model of perceptual experiences. This paper argues affective experiences involve a kind of personal level affective representation disanalogous from the representational character of perceptual experiences. The positive thesis is that affective representation is a non-transparent, non-sensory form of evaluative representation, whereby a felt valenced attitude represents the object of the experience as minimally good or bad, and one experiences that evaluative standing as having the power to causally motivate the relevant attitude. I show how this view can make sense of distinctive features of affective experiences, such as their valence and connection to value in a way which moves beyond current evaluativist views of affect.

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Emotions and the content of aesthetic experience

Cvejić

2022

Theoria

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In this article, I will draw a parallel between the phenomenology of aesthetic experience and the concept of affective intentionality. One of my aims is to show that ?component? approach is not appropriate both for aesthetic and emotional experience. I will lay emphasis on issues of the shaping of aesthetic content and its non-conceptuality. I will respond to the first problem by introducing the elements of affective intentionality account, particularly by referring to Goldie?s argument concerning the intentionality of feelings. Furthermore, I will clarify that attitude/content distinction cannot stand for aesthetic and emotional experience. The second issue will be addressed by referring to one of interpretations regarding Kant?s account of the judgment of taste. Even if the drawn parallels don?t provide a clear argument for equating aesthetic and emotional experience, the more modest aim of the paper is to point out the lessons of affective intentionality account, which could be helpful in understanding the aesthetic experience.

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Emotional Intentionality and the Attitude‐content Distinction

Cited by 4 publications

References 60 publications

Fear of the Past

Fear of the Past

Affective representation and affective attitudes

Emotions and the content of aesthetic experience

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