“…cognition (Ariffin, Coicaud, & Popovski, ; Barbalet, ; Berezin, ; Burkart & Weggen, ; Davis, ; Iagulli, ; Jasper, ; Kunkel, ; Loseke & Kusenbach, ; Lutz, ), - private/individual/internal/inner or public/collective/external/outer (Ariffin et al, ; Berezin, ; Harkin, ; Lively, ; Pilkington, ; Stets, ),
- mind or body (Chandler, ; Ross, ; Shilling, ; Smith‐Lovin & Thoits, ; Wettergren, ),
- ideational/discursive or materialist (Knopp, ; Lyon, ; Ross, ),
- micro or macro (Bericat, ; Berezin, ; Jasper, ; Stets, ),
- structure or culture/agency (Bericat, ; Fox, ; Jasper, ; Lively & Weed, ), and
- expressive or experiential (Ariffin et al, ; Illouz, Gilon, & Shachak, ; Lively, ; Rogers & Robinson, ).
And the list goes on. It is actually fairly difficult to find contemporary sociological writing on emotion that is not grounded in one or more dichotomies that go without a hint of interrogation (Craciun, ; Erickson & Cottingham, ; Harkness & Hitlin, ; Lively & Heise, ; Olson et al, ; Rogers & Robinson, ; Simon & Nath, ). There are, however, many others who seem compelled to diligently acknowledge dualisms as problematic (perhaps to placate critical audiences in their introductions), before flinging them about with great irony and carelessness.…”