Empathy, Emotion Regulation, and Moral Judgment

Abstract

For Heidi Maibom (ed.) Empathy and Morality, Oxford University Press. AbstractEmpathy's role in moral judgment has not received as much attention as its role in moral motivation. Yet given that emotions have at least a causal influence on moral belief, it is plausible that empathy makes an important difference. However, critics like Jesse Prinz point to empathy's inherent partiality and limitations as reasons to think that it has only a limited explanatory role and that it is normatively problematic. Drawing on the classical sentimentalist tradition in philosophy and recent psychological literature, I defend the view that when empathic reactions are subjected to emotion regulation by reference to an ideal perspective, they are after all fit to play a fundamental role in explaining why we make nonself-interested, interpersonally acceptable moral judgments. Getting along with others puts pressure on us to down-regulate empathy with the near and dear and up-regulate empathy with the distant and different. When we successfully do so, there's good reason to think that the resulting judgments are vindicated rather than undermined.In recent years, some striking claims have been made about the importance of empathyroughly, the capacity to share the feelings of others -to morality and prosocial action.Perhaps most notably, Michael Slote (2007Slote ( , 2010 maintains that empathy is the "cement of the moral universe" that "arguably constitutes the basis of both metaethics and normative ethics" (2010, 4). As inevitably happens with philosophical enthusiasms, there has also been a backlash, even among those who believe emotions are central to moral thought. Within the sentimentalist camp, Jesse Prinz (2011a, b) makes a thorough case against empathy, arguing it's neither constitutively, causally, developmentally, epistemically, nor motivationally necessary for moralizing. Indeed, Prinz argues that empathy is likely to lead us astray in moral thought, however important it is for personal relationships. Shaun Nichols (2004) and

Can Empathy Be a Moral Resource? A Smithean Reply to Jesse Prinz

“…In the philosophical literature,Kauppinen ( 2014 ) supports the view that regulation of one's emotions can occur implicitly and automatically, and need not always involve a conscious effort. Kauppinen draws on the work of Hume and Smith to develop his concept of 'ideal-regulated empathy,' defi ned as an "affective response to another's perceived situation that is regulated by reference to an ideal perspective."…”

Empatía y moralidad. Dimensiones psicológicas y filosóficas de una relación compleja

“…Y sustentada asimismo, añadiríamos ahora, con principios éticos sobre la libertad, igualdad y dignidad de todas las personas, principios de justicia y equidad. Pensar que éstas últimas, la pretensión de razonabilidad e imparcialidad, pueden ser soslayadas y fomentar una moral basada únicamente en el sentimentalismo y la 20 Kauppinen (2014) insiste en la importancia de esta regulación emocional, y llega a formular "una explicación sentimentalista neoclásica", cuya tesis reza así: "La mejor explicación de la variación en los juicios morales centrales es la variación en la empatía y en el ejercicio de la regulación emocional, según una perspectiva ideal". empatía (por muy ampliada que sea) es un absurdo.…”

“…corrección de principios morales más objetivos o sistemáticos, y su tendencia a la parcialidad, o el hecho de que sea altamente variable de una persona a otra, de un tipo de cultura y de socialización a otra, no sería realmente un problema. Algo que, al igual que Oxley (2011), Kauppinen (2014), y otros, considero insostenible.…”

Empathy and moral judgment

“…So, Hume and Smith agree that making moral judgments on the basis of empathy involves counteracting some of our natural tendencies. In contemporary terms, it demands a form of emotion regulation: we need to both up-regulate our empathic reaction on behalf of strangers and down-regulate our empathic reaction on behalf of those close to us (see Kauppinen 2014 for discussion with reference to empirical psychology). However, while this kind of view explains why natural empathy and our moral judgments diverge, it is hardly credible as a hypothesis about the causal history of each and every moral judgment.…”