Empirical metaphysics: the role of intuitions about possible cases in philosophy

Abstract

Frank Jackson has argued that only if we have a priori knowledge of the extension-fixers for many of our terms can we vindicate the methodological practice of relying on intuitions to decide between philosophical theories. While there has been much discussion of Jackson's claim that we have such knowledge, there has been comparatively little discussion of this most powerful argument for that claim. Here I defend an alternative explanation of our intuitions about possible cases, one that does not rely on a priori extension-fixers. This alternative explanation provides a vindication of our reliance on intuitions, while blocking Jackson's abductive argument for a priori semantic knowledge. In brief, I argue that we should regard our armchair intuitions as providing an important, a priori source of evidence for hypotheses about the contents of our implicit referential policies with regard to our terms. But all such hypotheses have a potential falsifier that is only discoverable empirically. In other words, gold-standard evidence for such hypotheses is always empirical.Keywords Intuition Á A priori knowledge Á Reference Á Two-dimensional semantics Á Philosophical methodHere's an interesting fact about speakers on which many arguments for and against a variety of philosophical positions depend: We often find ourselves with strong opinions about the proper evaluation of conditionals constructed in accordance with the following recipe.

Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, by Derk Pereboom

“…On Pereboom's view, conditional analyses are motivated by empirical facts about how we would respond to various cases. [Pereboom wavers between a Jackson/Chalmers‐inspired picture where it is our dispositions to respond to descriptions of these cases that matters, and a picture inspired by Janice Dowell (), on which “our actual future reactions to future empirical discoveries” (Pereboom, , p. 40) matter; but these are two different sorts of empirical fact about our responses.] For example, it is plausible that the concept ‘water’ has (something like) the conditional analysis Pereboom suggests only because if it turns out that the clear fluid of our acquaintance is a motley, then we would continue to apply this concept to the motley.…”

Contextualist Solutions to Three Puzzles about Practical Conditionals1

“…29 See footnote 26 for details and a slightly different possibility. 30 For an elaboration and defense of this way of understanding the needed intentions, see Dowell (2008) and (forthcoming). For brevity, I'll call this package "flexible contextualism about 'ought" or FCO.…”

Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge

“…What, then, is involved in the pretense‐game? A theory‐neutral answer, suggested by Dowell (2008), is that, when we pretend p , we (try to) put ourselves in a state that mimics the belief that p . This is a good approximate answer, but not informative enough.…”