Employee Ownership And Employee - Shareholders Satisfaction: An Analysis Of French Companies Listed On The SBF 250

Elouadi, Sara; Noamene, Tarek Ben; Chaher, Dhabi-UAE Dorsaf

doi:10.19030/jabr.v32i3.9647

Cited by 8 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 46 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The higher it is more important to be the minimum required return. Our research complements and enriches our previous work on the effects induced by property on organizational attitudes including satisfaction with work and the intention to leave Elouadi (2016) and Elouadi (2015). …”

supporting

confidence: 63%

Employee Shareholding and the Opportunity Cost of Lending Funds: An Empirical Study in the Context of French Companies in the SBF 250

Elouadi¹

2017

IOSR JEF

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In France, the development of employee shareholding is due to a real awareness and a genuine political commitment from the government De Gaulle who initiated the sharing and incentive. France offers, in addition, an incentive legislative framework for the development of employee ownership. Indeed, the law Macron (2015) reduces substantially the conditions for grants and taxation of employee shareholding. To this end, the rate of employer contribution was reduced from 30 to 20% and employee contribution of 20% is removed.Our work suggests a new framework for analyzing the effects of employee share ownership. Indeed, empirical work on employee ownership have invested two main directions. The first became interested in the effects induced by the Employee Ownership on business performance and the second explored the behavioral and attitudinal effects of the property. By introducing trust as a control variable to limit uncertainty and distrust of funds lenders, we propose to study the influence of employee participation in capital lenders interest rates Elouadi (2014).According to Charreaux and Desbrières (1998), the opportunity cost of money lenders is the minimum price required to undertake the transaction. Based on this definition, we can consider the opportunity cost lenders as the minimum rate of return required by the market. The opportunity cost then depends on the level of risk to lenders of funds. The higher it is more important to be the minimum required return. Our research complements and enriches our previous work on the effects induced by property on organizational attitudes including satisfaction with work and the intention to leave Elouadi (2016) and Elouadi (2015). I. Theoretical Framework : Employee Ownership And The Opportunity Cost LendersTrust is the most cost effective solution for shareholders and other stakeholders. It leads to the decline of the control mechanisms set up by the partners. Employee shareholding, for the trust he returns to the market, allows the relaxation of control requirements demanded by corporate partners such credit institutions.The survey by Ipsos Opinion conducted in June (1999) with a sample of employees, analyzes the motivations and would encourage employees to become shareholders in their company. The results reveal that 91% of employees say they have chosen employee shareholders for the confidence they have shown in the growth of their businesses. Also, the survey conducted by the (COB Altédia 1999), covering about 150 companies reveals that 72% of companies believe that employee ownership is a positive sign given to financial communication. Indeed, an employee shareholding policy, expressing mutual trust of employees and leaders in the future of their company, can raise the confidence of financial partners. This reduction of formal protection mechanisms results in a lower required rate. By (Rousseau and al 1993. Zucker 1986), confidence can be a substitute for the monitoring and governance mechanisms to control transactions. As such, Diamonds (1989) explains that...

show abstract

supporting

confidence: 63%

Employee Shareholding and the Opportunity Cost of Lending Funds: An Empirical Study in the Context of French Companies in the SBF 250

Elouadi¹

2017

IOSR JEF

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Moreover, this theory assumes the insufficiency of the mechanisms with regard to managerial control. These mechanisms initially designed for control can be transformed into entrenchment mechanisms (H. Alexandre and M. Paquerot, 2000;D. Elouadi, 2016).…”

Section: Investment In R and D Pillar Of Managerial Activismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managerial Discretion: The Relationship Between Investments in R & D and Performance -Revisited: Case of Tunisian Enterprises

Sfar

2021

JMS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article proposes a re-reading of the role of R & D investments in the performance equation when a manifestation of an opportunistic inclination on the part of managers occurs. Often, the manager and the owners express different expectations regarding investment choices in R & D. Although shareholders are looking for performance, the manager sometimes has a tendency to broaden his managerial discretion. The choice of R & D investments could thus reinforce managerial entrenchment. We will demonstrate the moderation exercised by managerial discretion on the R & D / Performance relationship.Our empirical validation will be put to examination against the Tunisian context by deploying various tests. We come to grips with the characteristics of the Tunisian context through an empirical study of 75 companies observed over a 7 -year time lapse, i.e. from 2008 to 2014. The explanatory analysis was an opportunity to highlight the existence of a moderation exercised over the main relationship dealt with.

show abstract

Employee Ownership in Morocco

Elouadi

2021

Corporate Leadership and Its Role in Shaping Organizational Culture and Performance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The aim of this work is to carry out an exploratory study on the situation of employee share ownership in Morocco in order to detect the effects induced by ownership on motivation, organizational involvement, and the intention to leave. To this end, the authors have used agency theory, which offers an interesting framework for analyzing the practice of employee share ownership, and they have proposed a synthesis of empirical work on the organizational effects of property. Subsequently, they set out their empirical approach in order to explain the progress of the field survey, which relates to the description of the situation of employee shareholding in Morocco. The results obtained confirm the empirical studies analyzed and show that employee share ownership improves the feeling of belonging to the company, motivation, and organizational involvement. On the other hand, ownership makes it possible to lower the departure intention of employee shareholders.

show abstract

Employee Ownership And Employee - Shareholders Satisfaction: An Analysis Of French Companies Listed On The SBF 250

Abstract: ABSTRACT

Cited by 8 publications

References 46 publications

Employee Shareholding and the Opportunity Cost of Lending Funds: An Empirical Study in the Context of French Companies in the SBF 250

Employee Shareholding and the Opportunity Cost of Lending Funds: An Empirical Study in the Context of French Companies in the SBF 250

Managerial Discretion: The Relationship Between Investments in R & D and Performance -Revisited: Case of Tunisian Enterprises

Employee Ownership in Morocco

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About