Employee Ownership, Employee Attitudes, and Firm Performance

Abstract

E2OI2 2 uosq M6L6 pi A6U LGCOIJflOU LIq 2B6GT GUU bn6LJLJ J3) 4poLorTp L6AT6 O JJ6OLA uq 6Aq6Uc6 ou coobsrCtA6 266 pOUU OLJ62 uq cps fl2 211JC6 JJ6 T8OO t'-'

Firm‐specific knowledge resources and competitive advantage: the roles of economic‐ and relationship‐based employee governance mechanisms

“…This study could not directly incorporate this information because of the unavailability of systematic archival data. In addition, some previous research studies have maintained that it is not employee ownership per se, but employees' voting rights and participation that motivate them to make firm-specific human capital investments (Caramelli and Briole, 2007;Klein, 1987;Kruse and Blasi, 1997). Again, we did not have detailed data on employees' voting rights and bargaining channels.…”

“…A firm's governance system might be considered analogous to a valve, the inappropriate functioning of which will hinder the flow of firm-specific knowledge resources toward full realization of economic rents. Therefore, the following are hypothesized: It should be noted however that unlike firmemployee relationships, employee stock ownership often influences employee incentives in a more complex manner (Kruse and Blasi, 1997). While employee equity ownership directly addresses employees' concerns about holdup by ensuring them bargaining power concerning ex post rent appropriation, it may not fully safeguard against employees' shirking behavior, which often occurs when value distribution is not fine-tuned to individual performance.…”

“…For example, a wide range of reasons have been proposed to explain firms' adoption of employee stock ownership, including providing employee benefits, inducing employee effort, fulfilling management's philosophical commitment to shared ownership, gaining tax advantages, and financing capital acquisitions (Klein, 1987;Kruse and Blasi, 1997).…”

“…Moreover, while equity ownership gives employees more opportunities to participate in the firm's decision-making process, greater involvement of employees may also lead to administrative inefficiency (Blasi, Kruse, and Bernstein, 2003). Therefore, as Kruse and Blasi (1997) emphasize, in order for employee ownership to serve as an effective mechanism of governance, firms need to give attention to '. .…”

The rise and fall of employee ownership in Estonia, 1987–2001

“…The evidence suggests that employee ownership has a modest beneficial impact on productivity and other organisational outcomes, at least when combined with other organisational changes (Blinder, 1990;Kruse and Blasi, 1997). However, it is not clear that these results can be directly generalised to the transition environment.…”