Employer networks, priming, and discrimination in hiring: An experiment

Takács, Károly; Squazzoni, Flaminio; Bravo, Giangiacomo; Castellani, Marco

doi:10.1002/9781118762707.ch15

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…In addition, critics center on the lacking realism of theoretical assumptions and a deterministic model of man. Takács et al (2014), for example, have proposed an agent-based model to overcome some of these deficits. Interlinking the economic approach with social psychological theories of discrimination appears particularly promising for endogenizing preference formation.…”

Section: Preference-based Discriminationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Use of Field Experiments to Study Mechanisms of Discrimination

Keuschnigg

Wolbring²

2016

Analyse &Amp; Kritik

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This paper discusses social mechanisms of discrimination and reviews existing field experimental designs for their identification. We first explicate two social mechanisms proposed in the literature, animus-driven and statistical discrimination, to explain differential treatment based on ascriptive characteristics. We then present common approaches to study discrimination based on observational data and laboratory experiments, discuss their strengths and weaknesses, and elaborate why unobtrusive field experiments are a promising complement. However, apart from specific methodological challenges, well-established experimental designs fail to identify the mechanisms of discrimination. Consequently, we introduce a rapidly growing strand of research which actively intervenes in market activities varying costs and information for potential perpetrators to identify causal pathways of discrimination. We end with a summary of lessons learned and a discussion of challenges that lie ahead. KeywordsCausal inference, discrimination, field experiment, labor market, social inequality, social mechanism Word count10,400 words AcknowledgmentsWe thank Sonja Pointner, Merlin Schaeffer, the editors, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. M.K. and T.W. contributed equally to this work.

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Section: Preference-based Discriminationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Use of Field Experiments to Study Mechanisms of Discrimination

Keuschnigg

Wolbring²

2016

Analyse &Amp; Kritik

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“…Typically the priming occurs by arbitrary nomination into named identifiable groups by the experimenter (Tajfel, 1970;Chen & Li, 2009), using writing tasks (Yopyk & Prentice, 2005;McLeish & Oxoby, 2011), sharing information such as surnames or pictures of other players (Bohnet & Frey, 1999;Burnham, 2003;Charness & Gneezy, 2008;Andreoni & Petrie, 2004), simple messages or stories (Takács et al , 2014), or in some cases using mutual gaze, touch or tapping rhythms in synchrony (Kurzban, 2001). We adopt the story-telling method in our groups of primed player pairs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Give and You Shall Receive: The Emergence of Welfare-Reducing Reciprocity

2015

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Give and You Shall Receive: The Emergence of Welfare-Reducing ReciprocityWe develop a new experiment to study the emergence of welfare-reducing bilateral alliances within larger groups, and the effectiveness of institutional interventions to curtail this reciprocal alliance behaviour. In each of the 25 rounds of our experiments, a player (the 'allocator') nominates one of three others as a co-worker (the 'receiver'), which deter-mines the group production that period to be the productivity of the receiver (which varies by round), but also gives the receiver a bonus and makes them the allocator in the next round. Alliances then form if two individuals keep choosing each other even when their productivities are lower than that of others, causing efficiency losses. Males and business students are found to be more likely to form welfare reducing alliances. Random allocator rotation policies and low bonuses fail to significantly improve overall welfare: rotation policies significantly reduce the rate of formation of new alliances but do not lead to the breakdown of existing alliances, while low bonus policies are only found to be effective when alliances are well established. This points to the importance of the strength of existing alliances for the chances of institutional interventions curtailing welfare reducing reciprocity, i.e. 'back-scratching'.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

When reciprocity becomes back-scratching: an economic inquiry

Murray¹

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This thesis reports four studies of a particular type of cooperation where the formation of coordinated groups through favour exchanges benefits the connected few at the expense of the many. This process is labelled back-scratching, and is a common feature of political decision-making where institutional powers allow for a large amount of discretion and the imposition of externalities in situations where property rights are not well-defined. Chapter 1 introduces the concept of back-scratching in as a coordination game with negative externalities, providing a common framework within which to incorporate the studies that follow.The first study in Chapter 2 uses a natural experiment to quantify the gains from back-scratching in political decisions about value-enhancing land zoning. The effectiveness of a variety methods used to support implicit favouritism are examined, including political donations, employing professional lobbyists, and investing in relationships. Using micro-level relationship data from multiple sources, characteristics of landowners of comparable sites inside and outside rezoned areas are compared. 'Connected' landowners owned 75% of land inside rezoned areas, and only 12% outside, and captured $410 million in value gains, indicating a trade in favours amongst connected insiders. Marginal gains to all landowners of connections in our sample were $190 million. Engaging a professional lobbyist appears to be a substitute for having one's own connections.

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Employer networks, priming, and discrimination in hiring: An experiment

Cited by 3 publications

References 54 publications

The Use of Field Experiments to Study Mechanisms of Discrimination

The Use of Field Experiments to Study Mechanisms of Discrimination

Give and You Shall Receive: The Emergence of Welfare-Reducing Reciprocity

When reciprocity becomes back-scratching: an economic inquiry

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