2015
DOI: 10.15185/izawol.136
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Employment and wage effects of extending collective bargaining agreements

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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citations
Cited by 21 publications
(15 citation statements)
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References 11 publications
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“…In doing this we follow the literature on monetary policy in heterogeneous agent models that emphasizes the different financial frictions faced by households (Debortoli and Galí ), and it is not obvious how such different frictions could map into labor market heterogeneities. In addition, our characterization of unionized labor markets that generate wage compression (in this case between Ricardian and non‐Ricardian workers) is consistent with the institutional features of European labor markets (Lindquist ; Mourre ; Villanueva ).…”
Section: The Modelsupporting
confidence: 73%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In doing this we follow the literature on monetary policy in heterogeneous agent models that emphasizes the different financial frictions faced by households (Debortoli and Galí ), and it is not obvious how such different frictions could map into labor market heterogeneities. In addition, our characterization of unionized labor markets that generate wage compression (in this case between Ricardian and non‐Ricardian workers) is consistent with the institutional features of European labor markets (Lindquist ; Mourre ; Villanueva ).…”
Section: The Modelsupporting
confidence: 73%
“…The implications of the LAMP hypothesis have been investigated in a number of theoretical studies (Albonico and Rossi 2014;Bilbiie 2008;Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés 2004;Motta and Tirelli 2012, 2015. Other theoretical studies have analyzed the potential role played by LAMP in allowing DSGE models to replicate certain business cycle facts, notably the consumption response to public expenditure shocks (Colciago 2011;Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés 2007) and to investment shocks (Furlanetto, Natvik, and Seneca 2013), and the reaction of output, hours, and consumption to productivity shocks (Furlanetto and Seneca 2012).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…emphasizes the di¤erent …nancial frictions faced by households(Debortoli and Galí, 2017), and it is not obvious how such di¤erent frictions could map into labor market heterogeneities. In addition, our characterization of unionized labor markets that generate wage compression (in this case between Ricardian and non-Ricardian workers) is consistent with the institutional features of European labor markets(Lindquist, 2005;Mourre, 2005;Villanueva, 2015).…”
supporting
confidence: 69%
“…Using French data, André (2012a) and Combault and Naouas (2015) show that actual wages are positively affected by wage floor changes. 2 Industry-level agreements are quasi automatically extended to all employees in an industry (see Villanueva, 2015, for a survey on extension procedures in Europe) and firms cannot opt out of industry-level agreements. 3 Magruder (2012) also reports similar institutional features of wage bargaining in South Africa and finds that centralised bargaining has a negative effect on employment.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%