Employment policy and corporate governance— An empirical comparison of the stakeholder and the profit-maximization model

Abe, Naohito; Shimizutani, Satoshi

doi:10.1016/j.jce.2007.02.006

Cited by 32 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Meanwhile, the percentage of in-house executives within the board had a negative impact on market employment patterns, but foreign ownership had no significant impact on employment outcomes. This suggests that external market pressures may be less important than the style of insider governance in determining employment patterns (see also Abe, 2002;Abe & Shimizutani, 2005). Similarly, strong employee voice in Japanese firms is associated with increased transparency to shareholders and greater shareholder voice (Miyajima, 2007).…”

Section: The Role Of Labor In Corporate Governance: Forgotten or Misumentioning

confidence: 99%

Comparative and International Corporate Governance

Aguilera¹,

Jackson

2010

The Academy of Management Annals

221

116

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In this article, we examine the state of the art in comparative and international corporate governance by identifying the key research questions, main concepts, and paradigms of explanations of cross-country diversity in corporate governance. First, we discuss the multiple definitions of corporate governance across disciplines and explore how this multi-dimensional nature of corporate governance posses challenges when making cross-national comparisons. Second, we review existing comparative research on corporate governance and highlight some of the main characteristics of comparative analysis. Third, we analyze how comparative corporate governance has been understood from four different scholarly perspectives: economics and management, culture and sociology, legal, and political paradigms. We conclude from this third section that future research should make an effort to 486 • The Academy of Management Annals better integrate cross-disciplinary paradigms. Fourth, we investigate what insights these four perspectives bring to understand change and stability better in two particular governance dimensions: corporate ownership and the role of labor in comparative corporate governance. Finally, we conclude the article with some forward looking suggestions regarding (1) how different perspectives of corporate governance can be more effectively integrated by adopting case-based, historical, and actor-centered forms of institutional explanations and by (2) discussing the current U.S. corporate governance system, frequently seen as the "best practice" model.

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Section: The Role Of Labor In Corporate Governance: Forgotten or Misumentioning

confidence: 99%

Comparative and International Corporate Governance

Aguilera¹,

Jackson

2010

The Academy of Management Annals

221

116

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Inside directors could have an incentive to resist employee lay-offs, but also to keep on ineffective managers against the interests of shareholders or institutional investors. Abe and Shimizutani (2007), for instance, find that board composition between inside and outside directors has a significant influence on the willingness of boards to remove excess employment. Similarly, Lindbeck and Snower (2001) have argued from a macroeconomic perspective that insiders have an incentive to protect incumbent employees at the expense of outside interests.…”

Section: Modeling Multiple Board Membershipmentioning

confidence: 99%

The small core of the German corporate board network

Milaković

Alfarano

Lux

2010

Comput Math Organ Theory

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Abstract:We consider the current bipartite graph of German corporate boards and identify a small core of directors who are highly central in the entire network while being densely connected among themselves. To identify the core, we compare the actual number of board memberships to a random benchmark, focusing on deviations from the benchmark that span several orders of magnitude. It seems that the board appointment decisions of largely capitalized companies are the driving force behind the existence of a core in Germany's board and director network. Conditional on being a board member, it is very improbable to obtain a second membership, but multiple board membership becomes increasingly likely once this initial barrier is overcome. We also present a simple model that describes board appointment decisions as a trade-off between social capital and monitoring ability.Keywords: Board and director interlocks, network core, network formation, market capitalization JEL classification: D85, L20, M14, M51 AbstractWe consider the current bipartite graph of German corporate boards and identify a small core of directors who are highly central in the entire network while being densely connected among themselves. To identify the core, we compare the actual number of board memberships to a random benchmark, focusing on deviations from the benchmark that span several orders of magnitude. It seems that the board appointment decisions of largely capitalized companies are the driving force behind the existence of a core in Germany's board and director network. Conditional on being a board member, it is very improbable to obtain a second membership, but multiple board membership becomes increasingly likely once this initial barrier is overcome. We also present a simple model that describes board appointment decisions as a trade-off between social capital and monitoring ability.

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“…Following the line of argument developed in the previous section, we will now refer to the stakeholder view framework (e.g., Abe and Shimizutani, 2005;Buono, 2003;Caldwell, 2004;Lamont, 2004;Mattingly, 2004a, b;Post et al, 2002;Sachs and Rühli, 2004;Walsh, 2005). Apart from its comprehensiveness, we use the stakeholder view framework mainly because of two reasons, namely its focus on wealth creation and its normative core that is compatible with sustainability.…”

Section: The Stakeholder View Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%