Empty Promises? Election Promise Fulfilment among Coalition Parties in the Czech Republic between 2006 and 2015

Abstract

Party mandate theory claims that parties form government coalitions so that they can fulfi l their election promises. This article looks at the party mandate model as applied to the arena of post-communist Europe and at the obstacles that can prevent a party from fulfi lling its mandate (the presence of a new type of party, hyperaccountability, short-lived governments). The article describes the fi ndings from a study examining the degree to which socio-economic legislative promises were fulfi lled by the second government of Mirek Topolánek, the fi rst government of Petr Nečas, and the (recent) government of Bohuslav Sobotka after a year and a half for all governments, and in the end of the term for Topolánek's and Nečas' governments. Coalition parties were found to have fulfi lled 19-40% of their election promises after a year and a half in offi ce, and this percentage had only increased slightly by the time the two governments that were studied for the full duration of their time in offi ce had reached the end of their term. Binary logistic regression models revealed that the odds of election promises being fulfi lled are greater if a promise is formulated as a commitment to maintain the status quo and if a promise is consensual and included in a coalition agreement. By contrast, there was no effect observed to result from party control of government ministries or from the advantage of being the prime ministerial party.

What makes a good minister of a political party? Impact of party- and field-related experience on party pledge fulfilment

“…The paper examines data on parties from three Czech coalition governments that were formed immediately after the elections in 2006, 2010 and 2013 (second Topolánek, first Nečas and Sobotka governments) and which were the first governments in the electoral period to win the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies. The Czech Republic ranks among countries with a lower level of party pledge fulfilment (Svačinová, 2016), possibly because of its frequent government breakdowns. Two governments out of the three which are the focus of this article have been terminated prematurely.…”

“…There is a suitable variation of ministerial features focused, such as various levels of field and political experience, and even the appointment of non-partisan ministers. Together with the short-lived Czech governments, the performance in pledge fulfilment is rather weak (Svačinová, 2016; Škvrňák, 2015). So, the features leading to the good performance of ministers can be well identifiable in the Czech case.…”