2020
DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2020.1730353
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

EMU and the Italian debt problem: destabilising periphery or destabilising the periphery?

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1

Citation Types

0
5
0

Year Published

2020
2020
2021
2021

Publication Types

Select...
6
1

Relationship

0
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 8 publications
(5 citation statements)
references
References 25 publications
0
5
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Massive government debt, a historic debt to GDP ratio, fear of systemic risk, and a cloudy political situation limits the ability of the government to focus on energy policy. Under European Union rules, Italy's debt problems and financial situation prevent government deficit spending to help grow the economy [60]. Notice that in the case of Italy, the 2017 CO 2 elasticity is negative and the GDP elasticity is negative, which is consistent with a slowdown in carbon dioxide emissions associated with a slowdown in economic activity.…”
Section: Decoupling Analysismentioning
confidence: 82%
“…Massive government debt, a historic debt to GDP ratio, fear of systemic risk, and a cloudy political situation limits the ability of the government to focus on energy policy. Under European Union rules, Italy's debt problems and financial situation prevent government deficit spending to help grow the economy [60]. Notice that in the case of Italy, the 2017 CO 2 elasticity is negative and the GDP elasticity is negative, which is consistent with a slowdown in carbon dioxide emissions associated with a slowdown in economic activity.…”
Section: Decoupling Analysismentioning
confidence: 82%
“…Indeed, countries in the periphery were pressured into reducing public spending and enacting strict austerity measures and enact structural reform aimed at Europeanising their economies toward growth, limiting national sovereignty over public finances and worsening the democratic deficit of the EU, the trust of citizens and the support for integration and democracy (e.g. Della Porta, 2015; Notermans and Piattoni, 2020;Pagoulatos, 2020;Papadopoulous, 2020;Crespy, 2020). Within this context, the periphery had to liberalise the labour market (Burlone and Tassinari, 2020) and external pressure gave way to substantial public sector reforms (Mascio et al, 2020), at a high social cost (Guillénn et al, 2016).…”
Section: The Health Legacy Of the Great Recession And Austeritymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Within this context, the periphery had to liberalise the labour market (Burlone and Tassinari, 2020) and external pressure gave way to substantial public sector reforms (Mascio et al, 2020), at a high social cost (Guillénn et al, 2016). As a result, the EU economic governance has been shown to contribute to destabilising the periphery both in its economic reality and in the perception of citizens, favouring the rise of Euroscepticism (Armingeon et al, 2016;Ruiz-Rufino and Alonso, 2017;Matthijs, 2017;Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2018;Notermans and Piattoni, 2020).…”
Section: The Health Legacy Of the Great Recession And Austeritymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, finance ministers sitting in the Board of Governors of the ESM are not accountable as a collective (Howarth and Spendzharova 2019) for the decisions they take on the funding and content of specific programmes. By extension, one wonders on what democratic authority the Commission (and the ECB and IMF) acts in these negotiations and to what extent the specific positions and priorities that it adopts can be said to 'represent' the collective interests of the peoples of the creditor countries, let alone that they take full account of the interests of the debtor countries (Notermans and Piattoni 2020;Pagoulatos 2020). In fact, the way the finance ministers delegate this responsibility and the way the task is phrased in purely functional terms ignores the political implications and appears as a way for the ministers to distance themselves from any political responsibility for the outcome of the negotiations.…”
Section: Financial Stabilization Institutionsmentioning
confidence: 99%