2015
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-18491-3_4
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Enabling NAME-Based Security and Trust

Abstract: Abstract. An integral component of almost any security and trust system is endpoint identity verification. The predominant identification primitive, used in most contemporary systems, is the digital certificate. A digital certificate binds a NAME (i.e., an "official way to refer to an entity") to a cryptographic public key, which is then used for the NAME verification. In this paper, we propose a NAME verification system that does not rely on digital certificates. Our solution uses Hierarchical Identity Based … Show more

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Cited by 7 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…It is a fact that key revocation in these schemes is nontrivial, as key revocation also means identity revocation. Our design assumes that a key revocation solution exists (eg, the serial number approach described in Fotiou and Polyzos). • Subscribers can reliably determine content integrity, provenance, and authenticity: Our solution considers only access control and content confidentiality. Content integrity, provenance, and authenticity verification are out of the scope of our system. • PKGs can reliably determine if a user is an owner of an identity and can securely distribute SKs: In our system, it is assumed that users cannot generate a S K that corresponds to an identity or a policy that do not own.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is a fact that key revocation in these schemes is nontrivial, as key revocation also means identity revocation. Our design assumes that a key revocation solution exists (eg, the serial number approach described in Fotiou and Polyzos). • Subscribers can reliably determine content integrity, provenance, and authenticity: Our solution considers only access control and content confidentiality. Content integrity, provenance, and authenticity verification are out of the scope of our system. • PKGs can reliably determine if a user is an owner of an identity and can securely distribute SKs: In our system, it is assumed that users cannot generate a S K that corresponds to an identity or a policy that do not own.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…secure and it is based on bilinear maps applied over the elements of a group G of order p, where p is a prime number. 5 In [10] we use this implementation to build name-based trust mechanism and we show how name resolution infrastructure can be used for delivering the necessary system parameters.…”
Section: Rnmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A signature ties content to its content name and ensures that the content's integrity, validity, and correctness are maintained regardless of where and when content is retrieved. NDN may not require the establishment of a specific certification infrastructure, instead opting for the outsourcing of trust management to compatible services [50].…”
Section: Ndn Securitymentioning
confidence: 99%