2015
DOI: 10.1111/ips.12103
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Enclosing Critique: The Limits of Ontological Security

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Cited by 119 publications
(46 citation statements)
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“…1 If ontological security is about finding a safe (imagined) haven, then ontological insecurity is about the lack of such a space in narrative terms. This lack, to speak with Lacan (2000), 2 is filled with desires for wholeness, thus implying that the 'security of being' that Giddens talks about always is and 1 The extent to which the study of ontological security opens up or closes down the question of the subject is currently much debated, with some scholars arguing that most ontological security literature still proceeds from the idea of a secure subject with a stable sense of identity (see, for example, Browning and Joenniemi 2013;Eberle 2019;Rossdale 2015). Against this criticism can be noted how a number of ontological security scholars have long insisted that the need for a stable identity is always something perceived or imagined (see, for example, Croft 2012;Kinnvall 2017;Kinnvall and Mitzen 2017).…”
Section: Populism and Ontological Insecuritymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…1 If ontological security is about finding a safe (imagined) haven, then ontological insecurity is about the lack of such a space in narrative terms. This lack, to speak with Lacan (2000), 2 is filled with desires for wholeness, thus implying that the 'security of being' that Giddens talks about always is and 1 The extent to which the study of ontological security opens up or closes down the question of the subject is currently much debated, with some scholars arguing that most ontological security literature still proceeds from the idea of a secure subject with a stable sense of identity (see, for example, Browning and Joenniemi 2013;Eberle 2019;Rossdale 2015). Against this criticism can be noted how a number of ontological security scholars have long insisted that the need for a stable identity is always something perceived or imagined (see, for example, Croft 2012;Kinnvall 2017;Kinnvall and Mitzen 2017).…”
Section: Populism and Ontological Insecuritymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Kinnvall 2004a, Croft 2012a, 2012b, Chernobrov 2016, as well as of the entire research field on statecraft, security issues, and diplomacy questioning realist, liberal and even constructivist theories of state agency and security (e.g. Mitzen 2006a, 2006b, Steele 2008, Rumelili 2015a, 2015b, Flockhart 2016, others have maintained that claims of ontological security foreclose important spaces of resistance, alterity, and ethical deliberations (Rossdale 2015, Browning 2016 or that research on ontological security conceptualises identity as singular and largely consistent patterns of behaviour (Lebow 2016). In response to such critique we maintain that any focus on ontological securities and insecurities proceeds from a view of identity and identifications as a process of becoming rather than being.…”
Section: Psycho- Socio- Politico-ontological Securitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Another substantial disagreement within much work on ontological security is focused on the extent to which the study of ontological security opens up or closes down the question of the subject in world politics, with certain authors 19 arguing that ontological security scholars encourage the illusion of unified identities. In response to such critique, we maintain that any focus on postcolonial borders and ontological insecurities proceeds from a view of identity and identifications as a process of becoming rather than being.…”
Section: Ontological Insecuritiesmentioning
confidence: 99%