ENCoVer: Symbolic Exploration for Information Flow Security

Balliu, Musard; Dam, Mads; Guernic, Gurvan Le

doi:10.1109/csf.2012.24

Cited by 28 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Despite their efficiency, these methods lack the precision needed to handle programs where public and sensitive information are securely interwoven. Few works [6,7,8], at least in the setting of software security, attempt to deduce what is learned by observing the public effects of the computation, and then verify that the acquired knowledge does not break a given information flow policy toward sensitive data.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recent advances software model checking and automated theorem proving show that verification of temporal epistemic properties for distributed systems is feasible [12]. Our tool, ENCoVer [13], an extension of Java Pathfinder, can verify information flow policies for interactive sequential programs. However, scalability and complexity of verification are issues that we postpone to future work.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Secure IT Systems

Nielson¹,

Gollmann²

2013

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. Securing communication in large scale distributed systems is an open problem. When multiple principals exchange sensitive information over a network, security and privacy issues arise immediately. For instance, in an online auction system we may want to ensure that no bidder knows the bids of any other bidder before the auction is closed. Such systems are typically interactive/reactive and communication is mostly asynchronous, lossy or unordered. Language-based security provides language mechanisms for enforcing end-to-end security. However, with few exceptions, previous research has mainly focused on relational or synchronous models, which are generally not suitable for distributed systems. This paper proposes a general knowledge-based account of possibilistic security from a language perspective and shows how existing trace-based conditions fit in. A syntactic characterization of these conditions, given by an epistemic temporal logic, shows that existing model checking tools can be used to enforce security.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secure IT Systems

Nielson¹,

Gollmann²

2013

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…Implicit information -as caused by guarded commands -not only depends on the actually performed execution path but also on the possibly followed (alternative) paths -which could be selected for different values of the pertinent guards. Accordingly, the FlowTracker will base the dynamic generation of the tentative addition on code annotations that stem from symbolic program executions performed at compile time, as inspired by [2].…”

Section: Need Of Local Flow Trackingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Constructing Inference-Proof Belief Mediators

Biskup

Tadros

2015

Data and Applications Security and Privacy XXIX

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Abstract. An information owner might interact with cooperation partners regarding its belief, which is derived from a collection of heterogeneous data sources and can be changed according to perceptions of the partners' actions. While interacting, the information owner willingly shares some information with a cooperation partner but also might want to keep selected pieces of information confidential. This requirement should even be satisfied if the partner as an intelligent and only semi-honest attacker attempts to infer hidden information from accessible data, also employing background knowledge. For this problem of inference control, we outline and discuss a solution by means of a sophisticated mediator agent. Based on forming an integrated belief from the underlying data sources, the design adapts and combines known approaches to language-based information flow control and controlled interaction execution for logic-based information systems.

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“…More recently, Torlak and Bodík (2014) have used our information-flow stack machine and its bugs with respect to EENI as a case study for their symbolic virtual machine, and report better results. Balliu et al (2012) created ENCOVER, an extension of Java PathFinder, to verify informationflow properties of Java programs by means of concolic testing. In their work, concolic testing is used to extract an abstract model of a program so that security properties can be verified by an SMT solver.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Testing noninterference, quickly

Hriţcu¹,

Lampropoulos

Spector-Zabusky

et al. 2016

J. Funct. Prog.

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Information-flow control mechanisms are difficult both to design and to prove correct. To reduce the time wasted on doomed proof attempts due to broken definitions, we advocate modern random testing techniques for finding counterexamples during the design process. We show how to use QuickCheck, a property-based random-testing tool, to guide the design of increasingly complex information-flow abstract machines, leading up to a sophisticated register machine with a novel and highly permissive flow-sensitive dynamic enforcement mechanism that is sound in the presence of first-class public labels. We find that both sophisticated strategies for generating well-distributed random programs and readily falsifiable formulations of noninterference properties are critically important for efficient testing. We propose several approaches and evaluate their effectiveness on a collection of injected bugs of varying subtlety. We also present an effective technique for shrinking large counterexamples to minimal, easily comprehensible ones. Taken together, our best methods enable us to quickly and automatically generate simple counterexamples for more than 45 bugs. Moreover, we show how testing guides the discovery of the sophisticated invariants needed for the noninterference proof of our most complex machine.

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ENCoVer: Symbolic Exploration for Information Flow Security

Cited by 28 publications

References 29 publications

Secure IT Systems

Secure IT Systems

Constructing Inference-Proof Belief Mediators

Testing noninterference, quickly

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