Ending Economic Coercion: Domestic Politics and International Bargaining

Abstract

Research on when economic sanctions end has emphasized either the international bargaining game played by the sender and the target or the redistributive politics and ruling coalition changes in each state. We contend that neither approach offers a fully satisfactory explanation for economic coercion termination. Bargaining is inconsistent with long coercion episodes while ruling coalition changes cannot inform our understanding of very short episodes. We argue that both bargaining factors and domestic realignments matter, but the influence of bargaining factors declines as a sanctions episode continues while the relevance of domestic realignments increases over time. Our empirical tests, which utilize the new Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions data set, provide support for both the bargaining and domestic realignment approaches, suggesting that unifying them is beneficial.

Strategic Demands, Credible Threats, and Economic Coercion Outcomes

“…The Effect of S's Reputation Costs on the Success Probability of Threats (dashed) and Imposed Sanctions (dash-dot) When p = 0.45, s = 0.25, t L = 0.1, t H = 0.7, k = 0.08, and c = 0.32 10 A recent study finds that strongly worded threats that specify clearly what concessions the target must make to avoid sanctions are associated with shorter coercive episodes that end favorably to the sender(Krustev and Morgan 2008).…”

Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data

“…1 For example, Drezner (1999) and Allen (2005Allen ( , 2008 find that sanctions against allies are more likely to succeed, but Drury (1998) and Krustev and Morgan (2011) find no support for this claim, and Nooruddin (2002) and Early (2011) find that sanctions against allies are less likely to succeed for US sanctions. Even when we consider the cost of sanctions, which many see as the most important predictor of sanctions success, the empirical findings are not conclusive (Bonetti 1998;Jing, Kaempfer, and Lowenberg 2003;Nooruddin 2002).…”

“…First, most findings reported in any one article result from one regression model (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2007). Even though many scholars conduct tests to ensure the robustness of their findings, these attempts are often Lam (1990) [+], Drezner (1999) [+], Allen (2005) [+], Krustev and Morgan (2011) [0], Early (2011) [−], Nooruddin (2002) [−]…”

“Winning” and “Losing” the Iran Nuclear Deal: How Advocacy Coalitions and Competition Shape U.S. Foreign Policy

“…At the same time, narrow leader‐driven models have continued to permeate the literature (Dyson ; Rapport ). More recent work in this vein has explored the relationships between leader transitions and changes in United Nations (UN) voting patterns (Mattes, Leeds, and Carroll ), elite framing and change (Bosold and von Bredow ), and the evolution of economic sanctions policies (Krustev and Morgan ).…”