This article explores why some societies witnessed less political liberalization during the Third Wave of democratization than others, and importantly, the conditions under which opposition forces may refrain from pressing for political reform. Focusing on the Muslim world, it also presents a more complete understanding of when and how political Islam hinders democratization. Specifically, historical experiences with Islamists in the 1970s and institutional structures established by the 1980s created a condition of uncertainty that enabled some incumbents to thwart liberalization during the Third Wave. Incumbents exploited the fear of political Islam, convincing many secularist opponents that they were better off with the current regime than with Islamist rule. The extent to which incumbents could succeed varied, depending on whether or not Islamist movements had been allowed to mobilize openly and the extent that the regime based its legitimacy on Islam. The argument extends beyond the Muslim world. What is fundamentally at stake is not whether Islam exists as a mobilizing ideology, but whether democratically-minded opponents believe that nondemocratic opposition groups exist that would potentially subvert a democratic opening.Keywords Islam . Democracy . MENA . Democratization . Authoritarianism Thirty years after the beginning of the Third Wave, Arab states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remained extraordinarily resistant to democracy. 1 Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey, and much later, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, all announced major reforms intended to strengthen popular participation in governance. Egypt led the way, beginning reforms in 1973 and St Comp Int Dev (2011) 46:163-190 DOI 10.1007 1 Other states in the MENA fared somewhat better, but they also have had very different historical experiences. Turkey and Iran were the seats of former empires, and Israel was formed as a settler state in the twentieth century.