Endogenous Formation of Alliances in Conflicts

Bloch, Francis

doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195392777.013.0020

Cited by 23 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…The payment had to be made both in the CHOICE and in the NO CHOICE treatment, and it had to be made by both players A and B, irrespective of their own choice. 13 Hence, the variations in terms of sequence of play (NO CHOICE …rst or CHOICE …rst) and the small payment attached to one of the subgames (paying 5 tokens either for "2-1" or for "1-1-1") led to four di¤erent types of sessions, each consisting of the CHOICE and the NO CHOICE treatment. Each subject participated in exactly one of the four session types.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Endogenous Group Formation in Experimental Contests

2012

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We study endogenous group formation in tournaments employing experimental three-player contests. We …nd that players in endogenously formed alliances cope better with the moral hazard problem in groups than players who are forced into an alliance. Also, players who are committed to expending e¤ort above average choose to stand alone. If these players are forced to play in an alliance, they invest even more, whereas their co-players choose lower e¤ort. Anticipation of this exploitation may explain their preference to stand alone.JEL codes: D72, D74

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Endogenous Group Formation in Experimental Contests

2012

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“…This paper is related to the literature on collective rent seeking, and to the literature on endogenous group formation in contests or conflicts. Bloch (), Kolmar (), and Flamand and Troumpounisy () provide excellent surveys of these literatures. In the literatures, a standard assumption is that, when players choose their effort levels, each group's sharing rule, if any, is observable to all the players—in other words, public information is assumed regarding sharing rules.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Endogenous Group Formation in Contests: Unobservable Sharing Rules

Baik

2015

Economics Manag Strategy

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We study contests in which players compete by expending irreversible effort to win a prize, the prize is awarded to one of the players, the winner shares the prize with other players in his group, if any, and each group's sharing rule is unobservable to the other groups and the singletons, if any, when the players expend their effort. The number of groups, their sizes, and the number of singletons are exogenous in the first model, whereas they are endogenous in the second model. We show that group formation occurs if the number of players is four or smaller, but does not occur otherwise. We examine the effect of endogenous group formation on total effort level and the profitability of endogenous group formation. In each of the two models, comparing the outcomes of the case of unobservable sharing rules with those of the case of observable sharing rules, we show that the two cases yield quite different outcomes.

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“…. This probability distribution is common 6 For a survey about alliances and alliance formation in contests, see Bloch (2009). There are only some partial results explaining why alliances may actually bene…t the members of the alliance.…”

Section: Absence Of Alliancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Kim and Che (2004) also consider standard (winner pay) auctions if some bidders are informed about some of their rivals'valuations of the object that is auctioned. 9 We could allow for some asymmetry in the valuations of the winner prize. For a range of valuations for which expending an e¤ort that is equal to the whole own budget remains optimal, this does not change the nature of the bene…t of information exchange.…”

Section: Absence Of Alliancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…As has been highlighted by Esteban and Sákovics (2003) and Gar…nkel (2004), the possibility of wasteful internal …ghts about the distribution of a prize inside the alliance can be a major drawback to the formation of alliances. For a comprehensive survey that considers alliances with and without intra-alliance con ‡ict, see Bloch (2009).…”

Section: Information Alliancesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Information alliances in contests with budget limits

Konrad

2011

Public Choice

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We study the role of information exchange through alliances in a framework with contestants who have binding budget limits and know their own budget limit but are incompletely informed about other contestants' budget limits. First, we solve for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then we consider the role of information exchange through alliances. Contestants learn the budget limits of all players who are within the same alliance, and then decide independently about their own contest efforts. This type of alliance formation is beneficial for alliance members and neutral for players who do not belong to the alliance. Also, a merger between alliances is beneficial for their members. Further, we consider merger between alliances and discuss the set of stable combinations of alliances. Terms of use: Documents in

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Endogenous Formation of Alliances in Conflicts

Cited by 23 publications

References 55 publications

Endogenous Group Formation in Experimental Contests

Endogenous Group Formation in Experimental Contests

Endogenous Group Formation in Contests: Unobservable Sharing Rules

Information alliances in contests with budget limits

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